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Abstract
The role of unmanned vehicles in military and commercial environments continues to expand,
resulting in Shared Manned-Unmanned (SMU) domains. While the introduction of unmanned
vehicles can have many benefits, humans operating within these environments must shift to
high-level supervisory roles, which will require them to resolve system errors. Error resolution
in current Human Supervisory Control (HSC) domains is performed using a checklist; the error
is quickly identified, and then resolved using the steps outlined by the checklist.
Background research into error resolution identified three attributes that impact the
effectiveness of an error resolution checklist: domain predictability, sensor reliability, and time
availability. These attributes were combined into a Checklist Attribute Model (CAM),
demonstrating that HSC domains with high levels of complexity (e.g. SMU domains) are ill-
suited to error resolution using traditional checklists. In particular, it was found that more
support was required during such error identification, as data is uncertain and unreliable.
A new error resolution checklist, termed the GUIDER (Graphical User Interface for Directed
Error Recovery) Probabilistic Checklist, was developed to aid the human during the error
identification process in SMU domains. Evaluation was performed through a human
performance experiment requiring participants to resolve errors in a simulated SMU domain
using the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist and a traditional checklist tool. Thirty-six
participants were recruited, and each was assigned to a single checklist tool condition.
Participants completed three simulated error scenarios. The three scenarios had varying sensor
reliability levels (low, medium, high) to gauge the impact of uncertainty on the usefulness of
each checklist tool.
The human performance experiment showed that the addition of error likelihood data using an
intuitive visualization through the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist improved error resolution in
uncertain settings. In settings with high certainty, there was no difference found between the
performances of the two checklists. While positive, further testing is required in more realistic
settings to validate both the effectiveness of the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist tool and the
Checklist Attribute Model.
Thesis Supervisor: Mary L. Cummings
Title: Associate Professor of Engineering Systems, Aeronautics and Astronautics
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Chapter 1. Introduction
The role of Unmanned Vehicles (UVs) is increasingly expanding in both simple and complex
domains. The U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) plans to invest $17 billion in Unmanned
Aircraft Systems (UAS) between 2008 and 2013, while between 2000 and 2008, the inventory of
UAS in DOD components rose from 50 aircraft to more than 6000 (GAO, 2008). Aviation,
however, is not the only domain where such unmanned system expansion is occurring, with
unmanned ground vehicles (UGV) being introduced to both commercial customers and
individuals. Examples include KIVA Systems, which manufactures autonomous robots for
warehouse operations for companies such as Amazon® and Zappos (Scanlon, 2009). iRobot ,
which introduced the Roomba, a robot vacuum cleaner in 2002, has sold 3 million of the robots
(The Economist, 2009) and continues to be a driving force in the growth of personal robots for
the home (iRobot Corporation, 2009), as well as for the U.S. Army with the PackBot (iRobot
Corporation, 2009).
In hostile environments where work tasks endanger human operators, the inclusion of unmanned
vehicles to fulfill these duties may not only increase system safety, but also improve operating
efficiency. Military equipment distribution warehouses are examples of hostile environments that
are expanding to include unmanned vehicles. Currently, work is underway at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology (MIT) to develop a system of autonomous forklifts to distribute pallet-
loaded supplies in these warehouses that are located in war zones (Chandler, 2009). The
inclusion of robotic forklifts in these complex, unstructured, and sometimes hostile military
environments has the potential to streamline activities and increase overall throughput, while
reducing customer wait times and potentially saving human lives.
1.1. Motivation
Although the potential benefits of automation in such hostile environments are significant, there
are many human factors issues that are associated with the introduction of autonomous vehicles
into such complex environments. Chief among these is the changing role of human operators
from direct and manual control of a system to being involved in higher-level planning and
decision-making (Cummings, Bruni, Mercier, & Mitchell, 2007). This shift to a supervisory role
requires the human operator to undertake a number of new functions (Sheridan, 1992), including:
* Scheduling tasks and planning tasks
" Monitoring the actions of autonomous entities in the system and detecting failures
* Intervening when required to return the system to the desired state
All Human Supervisory Control (HSC) domains require monitoring for failures and overcoming
error states to ensure high productivity while maintaining the safety of both humans and
autonomous entities. Error resolution in supervisory control systems continues to take the form
of serial checklists, either paper or electronic, that can serve as memory aid tools, ensuring that
all required recovery steps have been executed (Gawande, 2009). Traditional checklists begin
with an assumed error source and present recovery steps serially. These checklists suit domains
where system behavior is predictable and there is consistent performance feedback. In such
domains, the error source is relatively easy to identify and error resolution can (and should)
begin immediately. Traditional checklists may be inappropriate for autonomous vehicle domains
with high complexity, however, as these environments can be highly unpredictable and lack the
clear information feedback loops present in the more predictable supervisory control domains of
piloting aircraft and monitoring nuclear power generation systems.
Shared Manned-Unmanned (SMU) domains are a subset of HSC domains that incorporate both
autonomous vehicles and human operators interacting within a single system. While a high level
of complexity' typically characterizes all HSC domains (Cummings, Kirschbaum, Sulmistras, &
Platts, 2006), SMU domains can have enhanced complexity levels due to the large number of
distinct entities operating and interacting within the system. Uncertainty in SMU domains also
exists, as human behavior is less deterministic and system boundaries are often undefined,
resulting in unpredictable environmental factors acting on the domain. With such high
complexity and uncertainty levels, error resolution in these systems can become complicated and
could benefit from additional diagnostic information from various sources. As the prevalence of
SMU domains will only continue to increase as technology advances, development of an error
Complexity is defined by Merriam-Webster as "the quality or state of being hard to separate, analyze, or
solve."
resolution tool designed specifically for such environments is critical to ensure domain efficiency
and the safety of humans operating within the system. Unfortunately, alternative error resolution
tools, or checklists, designed specifically for highly complex SMU environments have not yet
been developed.
1.2. Problem statement
Current error recovery checklists designed for use in traditional HSC domains, such as aviation
and process control, are ill-suited to the unique characteristics of SMU domains, which are
increasingly occurring in military, commercial, and various consumer environments. A new kind
of error resolution tool, which allows human supervisors in SMU domains to overcome system
errors efficiently, while maintaining domain safety, is required. This research proposes the
development of this alternative checklist, which will be designed to satisfy the unique needs of
SMU domains.
1.3. Research objectives
This research has three objectives:
* Identify the important attributes of HSC domains, their relationship to each other, and
how they can be combined to establish a domain attribute model, which can be used to
categorize HSC domains.
- Develop a new error resolution tool designed specifically for HSC domains that include
autonomous vehicles. The design of this tool can be guided by previous research in serial
checklists, complex work domains, automation, human decision-making, and information
visualization.
- Evaluate the new error resolution tool against a traditional checklist tool to determine
which is more effective in supporting error resolution in a representative SMU domain.
The objective of this new checklist is to improve the error identification and recovery process in
SMU domains, ensuring that human supervisors within these environments can accurately and
efficiently identify the source of an error, recover from the error, and transition the system back
into an operational state.
1.4. Representative SMU domain
This research employs the previously discussed autonomous forklift domain to demonstrate the
new, alternative checklist. Currently, military distribution warehouses, which store and distribute
items required for U.S. Army active duty, utilize manually operated forklifts. Complexity and
uncertainty in the domain is already high, as the operations of multiple manually operated
forklifts must be coordinated to ensure that the warehouse environment runs efficiently. The war-
zone environment introduces potential unpredictable events resulting from militant actions, and
environmental factors, such as rain and wind, can negatively impact the open-air warehouse.
To increase warehouse efficiency, as well as to remove humans from the dangerous and exposed
position of manually operating forklifts, the U.S. Army has proposed automation in the form of
robotic forklifts. The introduction of these robotic forklifts will result in an SMU domain. This
envisioned SMU domain will incorporate robotic forklifts (RFs), ground-level human operators
who will interact with and direct the RFs in their tasks, and a high-level human supervisor who
will monitor both the RFs and the human operators. While the current military warehouse
environment has both high complexity and uncertainty, the addition of RFs only increases the
unpredictability of the environment, and as a direct result, traditional error resolution checklists
may not be appropriate. Therefore, the alternative checklist developed through this research will
be applied to the autonomous forklift domain to determine whether error resolution efficiency in
this representative SMU domain improves with this new tool.
1.5. Thesis overview
This thesis contains the following chapters:
e Chapter 1, Introduction, describes the motivation and research objectives of this thesis.
e Chapter 2, Background, outlines the current state of error resolution in supervisory
control systems. This chapter identifies the characteristics of HSC domains that are
important in error resolution, with three domain attributes identified: domain
predictability, sensor reliability, and time availability. These attributes are combined into
an attribute model that categorizes HSC domains, and identifies shortcomings of current
checklist tools. This chapter also presents relevant research material that guides the
design and development of the alternative checklist tool.
* Chapter 3, GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist, uses the background research detailed in
Chapter 2 to develop a new error resolution tool. The features of this probabilistic tool are
demonstrated using the autonomous forklift project. Utilizing the domain attribute model
developed in Chapter 2, two case studies are conducted to form an experimental
hypothesis as to the best error resolution system for SMU domains.
- Chapter 4, Experimental Evaluation, describes the human performance experiment,
incorporating a simulation of the SMU autonomous forklift domain, used to test the
hypothesis of this research. Details include a discussion of participants, procedures, and
experimental design.
- Chapter 5, Results, presents the findings of the human performance experiment using
such metrics as number of error confirmations, cognitive strategy, and subjective appeal
for both a traditional-style checklist and the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist.
* Chapter 6, Conclusions and Future Work, compares the results of the human performance
experiment with the research hypotheses. The chapter also provides a set of design and
future experimental recommendations based upon the experimental results. The chapter
concludes with a description of the future work necessary to generalize this research and
integrate alternative error resolution methods into current and future practice.
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Chapter 2. Background
In this chapter, common characteristics of HSC domains are investigated to determine the
functionality that would be required for a new error resolution checklist in an SMU domain. An
examination of current checklist systems is also performed in order to determine the
shortcomings of current error resolution systems when applied to SMU environments.
Through this initial research, three HSC domain attributes are identified that have an impact on
error resolution: domain predictability, sensor reliability, and time availability. These attributes
are used to identify the current HSC domains that are well-suited to error resolution with
traditional checklists, as well as those domains that are currently not well served, providing
justification for the development of a new error resolution tool to be used in select HSC domains.
Relevant research in the fields of automation, human judgment under uncertainty, and
information visualization is reviewed to guide the development of the alternative checklist.
2.1. Classifying complex supervisory domains
HSC domains can be grouped into two major categories: causal domains and intentional
domains. By gaining an understanding of the characteristics of HSC domains, and which
category individual domains fall into, the functionality required of an error resolution checklist
can be better understood.
2.1.1. Causal domains
Causal domains are closed-loop systems that are isolated from their environment (Vicente,
1999). These domains have a direct feedback loop between the current state of the system and
future system actions ensuring that the goals of the domain are continually met. Causal systems
generally operate in predictable ways, as a result of clear constraints (Cummings & Guerlain,
2003; Wong, Sallis, & O'Hare, 1998). These constraints include behavior being dictated by laws
of physics and the system having clear boundaries. An example of a causal domain is a power
generation plant.
Supervisors in causal domains are responsible for monitoring the physical health status of the
system, which can be closely observed through the extensive use of state sensors. If an error
occurs in a causal system, the source of the error is relatively easy to pinpoint. With the error
source identified, supervisors in these systems only need to recover from the failure and
transition the causal system back to an operational state. Emergency checklists are usually used
for error recovery, with the required steps printed on paper and stored in procedure books or
included electronically as part of a computer system within the domain. An example of
emergency checklist books within the Chattanooga nuclear power plant simulator is shown in
Figure 1 (U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2010).
Figure 1: Shelves of emergency procedures at Chattanooga nuclear power plant simulator.
2.1.2. Intentional domains
Intentional domains are considered to be open-loop and are subject to external influences
(Vicente, 1999). Instead of goals being met by a clear feedback loop that dictates future system
actions, outcomes are driven by motivations of individuals and groups that are part of the
organization active in the domain: 1) the individual acting in a supervisory role, and 2)
individuals and groups outside of the system whose actions can impact operations. An example
of an intentional domain is command and control.
. . ..... .. ........ 
There is a high level of unpredictability and uncertainty within intentional domains, with
unanticipated events likely to occur. According to (Cummings & Guerlain, 2003; Wong et al.,
1998), this is in part due to:
- Human decisions directly dictating system behavior, as opposed to laws of physics
dictating system behavior
e Systems not having obvious boundaries, and as a result, being influenced by highly
uncertain environmental factors that cannot be controlled or anticipated
If an error occurs in an intentional system, the source of the error is more difficult to identify,
due to high levels of uncertainty. Therefore, basic emergency checklists, which focus on error
recovery once the error source has been identified, may not be a viable option within these
domains.
SMU domains
SMU domains fall under the categorization of intentional domains, but can have increased levels
of unpredictability due to the inclusion of autonomous vehicles within the environment. In
traditional intentional domains, the main system entities are humans, who perform manual
operating tasks within the system or high-level supervision tasks of human operators and
statically located automation. In SMU domains, however, there is the addition of mobile
autonomous vehicles. As a result, the number of distinct entities increases, and may include:
- Autonomous vehicles
- Human operators that direct autonomous vehicles
* Human operators that manually operate vehicles
- High-level human supervisor monitoring the entire system
With an increase in the number of distinct domain entities, there is also an increase in the number
of different interactions occurring between the entities within the system, as represented in
Figure 2 (Naval Research Laboratory, 2006). As a result, SMU domains have increased
complexity over general intentional domains, and are often far more complex than causal-based
systems.
Figure 2: SMU domain with multiple unmanned vehicles.
2.2. System sensor quality
In order to operate autonomous vehicles within an unpredictable environment, it is vital that
autonomous vehicles can detect environmental cues that guide their actions and behavior. The
ability to detect cues from the environment ensures that these vehicles do not have to be
consistently teleoperated by a human operator, but can instead independently select behaviors in
order to fulfill mission objectives.
A system has reliable sensors if they consistently and accurately measure intended system
parameters and states. Unfortunately, in many complex work environments there can be
uncertainty associated with the data available to operators, resulting in the current state of the
system being unclear (Vicente & Rasmussen, 1990; Vicente, 1999). For example, LIDAR (Light
Detection and Ranging) sensors, which find the range of a distant target and allow an
autonomous vehicle to sense potential obstacles in the environment, could provide erroneous
data due to both systematic errors (e.g., laser detector bias) or random errors (e.g., signal-to-noise
ratio, type of terrain, transmission properties of the atmosphere) (Huising & Pereira, 1998).
. ....... .......... ... ... ..
Low sensor reliability impacts the accuracy of the data that may be used by both automation and
a high-level human supervisor for error resolution. If current system data transmitted by
automation to the human supervisor is inaccurate, identification of the source of system failure
could become more difficult and may lead to errors. In addition, if the source of system failure is
incorrectly identified, domain efficiency and human safety within the domain could be
compromised.
2.3. Errors in SMU environments
Reason (1990) argues that human error occurs when "a planned sequence of mental or physical
activities fails to achieve its intended outcome" (p. 9). Unfortunately, in SMU systems, the
source of system failure may not only be human-related. In such domains, autonomous entities
present in the system can experience logic-based errors (resulting from pre-programmed coding
mistakes) and component failures, with both potentially resulting in undesirable system behavior.
When supervising SMU domains, it is important for human supervisors to be able to resolve all
errors, both human and autonomy generated, as quickly as possible in order to return the system
to normal operating conditions. This process, which includes identification of the error source
and recovery from the identified error, can be grouped together using the term error resolution.
When a failure occurs in an HSC domain, it is always important to identify the source of the
failure and recover from the failure as promptly as possible, in order to transition the system
back into an operational state. In some time-critical domains, however, both human life and the
integrity of the system depend on efficient resolution of the error state. If an error is not resolved
within a short, limited duration, planes can crash, nuclear reactors can meltdown, and patients
can die. To support supervisory-level error recovery, as well as maintain efficiency in error
resolution, checklists are often implemented in an assistive role. These checklists guide the
supervisor, step by step, through the recovery process. As supervisory control systems are
utilized more frequently for monitoring complex work domains, checklists for error resolution
have been implemented widely in workstations (Commission on Engineering and Technical
Systems, 1997).
2.4. Traditional checklists
Traditional checklists present procedural steps serially as an aid to memory, ensuring that all
required steps in some process are executed. An example of a traditional checklist, in paper-
based form, is presented in Figure 3 (Department of the Army, 2004). This checklist is for the
Shadow 200 unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), which is flown by the U.S. Army and Marine
Corps for surveillance, targeting, and reconnaissance (AAI Corporation, 2010). Even though the
UAV is flown remotely, and therefore, the loss of the aircraft does not translate directly into the
loss of human life, it is vital that system failures do not result in damage to the structural
integrity of these very costly machines. Therefore, it is necessary that ground-control pilots be
given procedures to resolve all conceivable Shadow 200 emergencies, including engine failure,
fuse failure, and high engine temperature.
Figure 3: Shadow 200 UAV checklist.
Checklists are generally implemented in HSC domains in two capacities:
* Normal checklists: used as a memory aid for completing routine procedures.
* Emergency checklists: used during error situations to recover from one or more system
failures and transition the system back into an operational state.
AV High Engine Temperature
CAUTION
Climb to a safe altitude may be continued for no more than 2
minutes. Once at safe altitude and level, if over-temperature
condition persists for more than 2 minutes RTB. If poor WOT
RPM and climb performance is observed RTB. Failure to
comply could result in loss of AV.
CAUTION
Two or more indications (High CHT, High RAO, Low WOT
RPM, Low Rate of Climb) are present RTB for engine
investigation. Failure to comply could result in loss of AV.
1. Altitude .......................................................................... Level (AVO )
2. Airspeed .................................................................. 70 Knots (AVO)
3. Tem ps.......................................................................... M onitor (A VO )
Temps remain high
4. Land........................................................ As Soon As Possible (AVO)
Temps normal
5. M ission...----............................... Continue (AVO)
Human supervisors are typically well trained on how and when to utilize Normal checklists.
During system operation, there are predetermined time slots when particular tasks need to be
completed before operations can progress. For example, airplane pilots must complete a "Pre-
Landing" checklist, which includes lowering the landing gear, extending the landing spoilers,
and braking as required (Transport Canada, 2001). Interaction with Emergency checklists is less
structured, however, as failure occurrences are often difficult to foresee. When using an
Emergency checklist, the supervisor not only has to complete predetermined recovery steps, but
also needs to be able to identify the source of the error so that the appropriate checklist can be
selected.
Often, traditional checklists will begin with an assumed error source that has been identified
through automated sensor and/or human feedback. The human supervisor then proceeds serially
through recovery steps. Traditional checklists are therefore appropriate for domains where
system behavior is predictable and there is consistent system state feedback. In such causal
systems, the error source is relatively straightforward to identify, system complexity is relatively
understood, and sensor reliability is high. With this straightforward error identification process,
error recovery can (and should) begin immediately.
If the environment is intentional with the enhanced complexity of SMU interactions, the source
of the error may be difficult to identify due to the unpredictability and uncertainty within the
domain. The reliability of the sensors located on the autonomous vehicles in SMU environments
can also lead to uncertainty in error identification. Attention will likely need to focus on the error
identification process. Hence traditional checklists, which focus only on error recovery, may
need to be modified to be appropriate for such domains.
2.5. HSC domain attributes for error identification
Based on this background research, three HSC domain attributes deemed to have an impact on
the error resolution process were identified: domain predictability, sensor reliability, and time
availability.
It is important to note that these HSC attributes predominantly impact the error identification
portion of error resolution, as uncertainty and inaccuracy will make the identification of the error
source more complicated. Error recovery, on the other hand, is not impacted by these domain
attributes. Once the error has been accurately identified, the required recovery steps to resolve
the error will remain the same, regardless of the level of domain predictability, sensor reliability,
and time availability in the system.
2.5.1. Domain predictability
The two HSC domain classifications, causal and intentional, dictate the predictability of domain
behavior. A system is predictable if it has well-defined boundaries; inputs and outputs into the
system are known and documented, making unanticipated events unlikely (Vicente, 1999). Low
Domain Predictability (LDP) could be seen as a characteristic of intentional domains, while High
Domain Predictability (HDP) could be seen as a characteristic of causal domains. As previously
noted, error identification may be difficult in intentional domains, as there are high levels of
uncertainty and complexity, which can be further enhanced in SMU environments.
2.5.2. Sensor reliability
Sensor reliability assesses how accurately the system sensors measure intended system
parameters and states. An HSC domain could have sensors whose reliabilities range from Low
Sensor Reliability (LSR) to High Sensor Reliability (HSR). For example, inherent characteristics
of the domain environment, such as blowing sand in war zones located within desert climates,
can negatively impact the accuracy of domain sensors, resulting in the feedback of low reliability
data to the system supervisor. This inaccurate data may complicate error identification when a
system failure occurs, as the supervisor will be uncertain whether they can trust the data provided
from the sensors, and utilize it during identification of the error source.
2.5.3. Time availability
Time availability is an important factor when recovering from an error in some HSC domains, as
the inability to resolve an error within a restricted time window may result in harm to system
entities. A domain has restricted time availability when system failure or human safety will be
compromised if the error is not resolved within a limited duration, which varies for different
HSC domains (Inagaki, 2006), but can range from seconds to hours. An HSC domain could
range from Low Time Availability (LTA) to High Time Availability (HTA). If there is
uncertainty associated with the source of a system failure, error identification can be difficult in
domains with LTA, with time pressure potentially having negative effects on human judgment
and decision-making.
An example of an LTA system is a nuclear reactor plant. The Chernobyl nuclear plant accident
had a restricted time window for error resolution, as can be seen by the devastation left behind
after the operational errors went unresolved and a series of consequences led to the explosion of
a reactor. UGV systems, on the other hand, typically have medium to high time availability.
While it is important that the error is resolved efficiently, failure to resolve the error is unlikely
to result in the loss of human life. Damage to system integrity, however, is likely.
2.5.4. Checklist Attribute Model (CAM)
The three HSC domain attributes were combined into a graphical display, termed the Checklist
Attribute Model (CAM), with each attribute represented as the edge of a tetrahedron (Figure 4).
In the model, each attribute edge can be broken down into three interval scales, ranging from
low, to medium, to high (i.e. the edge of the tetrahedron corresponding to sensor reliability
ranges form LSR at the bottom of the tetrahedron to HSR at the top of the tetrahedron).
This graphical representation categorizes HSC domains by their need for decision-support during
error identification. Error identification in HSC domains with HDP, HSR, and HTA is not
mentally demanding, as uncertainty is low, data is reliable, and time is available for selecting the
source of system failure. Traditional checklists, which have been utilized in HSC domains for
decades, can be useful in such domains, as their limited assistance during error identification and
primary focus on error recovery steps is suitable for the low mental demands associated with
such domains.
Error identification in HSC domains with LDP, LSR, and LTA is mentally demanding as
uncertainty is high, data is unreliable, and time is restricted for identifying the source of system
failure. Traditional checklists are not appropriate for these domains, as decision-support during
error identification is not provided to assist the human supervisor in error selection. SMU
domains, which are intentional and highly complex, are examples of environments with such
characteristics, and therefore, are not well served by traditional checklist systems. An alternative
checklist, which assists the supervisor during error identification, is therefore required.
High
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Figure 4: Human supervisory domain attributes for checklist design.
Error identification in HSC domains with Medium Domain Predictability (MDP), Medium
Sensor Reliability (MSR), and Medium Time Availability (MTA) falls into a gray zone that is
difficult to categorize. The appropriate checklist for these domains may be either a traditional
checklist or the alternative checklist, depending on the overall level of complexity and
uncertainty. As any uncertainty can negatively impact the error resolution process, assistance
during error identification in such HSC domains, provided through the alternative checklist, may
prove beneficial.
The CAM visualization represents all HSC domains. As traditional checklists are best suited to
HSC domains with HDP, HSR, and HTA, the graphical model indicates that these checklists are
ideal for domains falling into the high section of the tetrahedron. As technology advances and
environments increase in size and complexity, fewer HSC domains will have such
characteristics. Thus, the proportion of HSC domains that are suited to error resolution with
traditional checklists will become (and is already becoming) smaller, as depicted in Figure 4.
Complex HSC domains, including SMU systems, will continue to increase in frequency,
highlighting the need for an alternative error resolution tool. Considerations in the design of such
a checklist tool are discussed in the following section.
2.6. Alternative checklist design considerations
The need for a checklist specifically designed for SMU domains has been identified. This
checklist will incorporate a decision support tool to guide the human supervisor in accurately
identifying the source of the error, enhancing efficiency and safety in SMU environments during
error identification. There are many considerations that must be made in the design of such a
checklist. These considerations are discussed in the following subsections.
2.6.1. Defining role of automation
Parasuraman and Riley (1997) define automation as "the execution by a machine agent (usually a
computer) of a function that was previously carried out by a human" (p. 231). Automation can be
incorporated into a system to various degrees, ranging from the human in complete control of the
system to the automation in complete control of the system. While high levels of automation can
result in a lower taskload for the human supervisor (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens, 2000),
if the level of automation is too high, supervisors may experience a loss of situation awareness as
a result of being out of the decision-making loop (Kaber, Endsley, & Onal, 2000). In addition,
consistently relying on automation during decision-making can result in skill degradation
(Parasuraman et al., 2000).
While automation can be applied to all aspects of HSC domains, there are two particularly
relevant applications in SMU domains: 1) the unmanned vehicles that operate within the
environment, and 2) the decision-support tool provided to the high level supervisor in the system.
While determining the tasks and capabilities of the unmanned vehicles in an SMU domain is
outside the scope of this thesis, it is essential to consider the contributing roles that the supervisor
and the automation will play during error resolution in order to achieve efficient and safe failure
recovery. Once an appropriate automation level has been determined, this can be built into the
alternative checklist system.
When automating an error resolution tool, four different categories related to the distinct stages
of human information processing must be considered: information acquisition, information
analysis, decision and action selection, and action implementation (Parasuraman et al., 2000).
Each of these categories can be automated to varying degrees, with the appropriate automation
range determined by considering the human performance consequences of the automation, as
well as the reliability of the automation and the potential costs of incorrect decisions/actions. For
error resolution support in the alternative checklist, the categories of information acquisition and
decision and action selection were identified as the areas where automation could be of the
greatest assistance to the human supervisor.
In SMU domains, information acquisition is predominantly performed by automation through the
use of sensors (Parasuraman et al., 2000). During error resolution, it will be useful to the human
supervisor to have this information organized by context, location, and other criteria, absolving
the supervisor from having to dedicate cognitive processes to such tasks. By applying automation
to information acquisition and organization, the focus of the human supervisor can be shifted
from low-level sensory activities to high-level reasoning about the collected data, or decision
selection.
While automation of the information acquisition process will likely be beneficial during error
resolution, automating decision and action selection may not be appropriate due to the high level
of complexity and uncertainty associated with SMU environments. As the sensor-collected data
may be inaccurate, the deductive reasoning abilities of automation may be ill-suited to decision-
making and error source identification. The inductive reasoning abilities of the human
supervisor, on the other hand, may be better matched (Fitts, 1951), and therefore, the human
should be responsible for error source identification during error resolution. This source
identification can be assisted by the automation, however, through the environmental data that it
collects and organizes.
2.6.2. Human role in error identification
By including the human in decision and action selection, or error identification, the overall
efficiency of the error resolution process then relies on the judgment of the human supervisor.
Unfortunately, human judgment under uncertainty is not perfect, due to incomplete knowledge
about the problem space and limited computational abilities. Further, time availability within an
HSC domain can negatively impact judgment during error identification. Under time pressure,
human decision-makers cannot always employ the decision-making strategy that determines the
best alternative, as they may not have the time or attentional resources to consider and evaluate
multiple hypotheses (Sarter & Schroeder, 2001). In such conditions, accuracy may be traded for
time savings, and decision-making heuristics may need to be employed (Tversky & Kahneman,
1974).
Humans use a number of heuristics when making decisions in situations where there are time
constraints, as well as incomplete knowledge and a bound on computing abilities. Three well-
known decision-making heuristics that may impact the error identification process are:
- Representativeness: The probability of event B being of type A is evaluated by the degree
to which B resembles A (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). This, unfortunately, neglects the
prior probability of the type A event occurring in the world. Without knowledge of past
system performance, a human supervisor in an SMU domain may be apt to overestimate
the likelihood of unlikely errors, due to their similarity with available system data.
- Availability: The probability of an event is based on the ability to retrieve similar events
from memory (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Decision-makers are inclined to believe that
an event is more likely to happen in the world if that event can be easily retrieved,
although this ease of retrieval may not accurately reflect the true probability of
occurrence. As error identification in SMU intentional domains is difficult, this decision-
making bias could negatively impact error source identification, with the supervisor
basing identification on availability instead of collecting data that confirms or refutes the
believed error source.
e Fast and frugal: A subclass of decision-making heuristics that employ a minimum of
time and computation to make judgments (Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000). Fast and frugal
heuristics limit the search through options using stopping rules, one of the most basic of
which is one-reason decision-making, where the selection between choices is based on a
single metric. This is likely to be employed during error identification in situations with
LTA, and would be particularly detrimental to error source selection in times of LSR. If
the human supervisor were to use sensor data as the metric for error selection, inaccurate
sensor data could result in incorrect error identification.
Humans employ decision-making heuristics as coping mechanisms, reducing complex tasks to
more simple judgments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). These heuristics are therefore quite
useful, as they allow for time and computational savings and often produce results that are good
enough. Sometimes, however, the employment of heuristics can lead to severe reasoning errors.
If these errors occur in non-critical environments, then the repercussions are not as far reaching.
For example, if a student bases team selection for a project on how well candidates represent the
"ideal" teammate, consequences from a bad team member selection will only be felt for the
duration of the project, resulting in limited annoyance and frustration. If a human supervisor in a
complex environment (e.g. nuclear power generation, aviation) employs bad judgment, however,
negative consequences can be much farther reaching, and may include loss of system integrity
and human life.
Error identification in SMU domains, as previously discussed, is difficult due to the high level of
complexity and uncertainty in these environments. As the consequences of poor decision-making
in critical HSC domains can be grave, it is crucial that a decision-support tool be provided to
assist the human through the error identification process during error resolution. While the
functions supported by such a tool were discussed in Section 2.6.1, with a focus on information
acquisition and organization, how this tool will provide support has yet to be determined.
Decision-making heuristics often involve subjective assessments of probabilities, with
inaccuracies sometimes resulting. Specifically looking at error identification in SMU domains,
heuristics could result in the incorrect identification of an error source. In order to prevent (or
limit) incorrect error identifications, historical error occurrence data could be collected by a
decision-support tool and presented to the supervisor, providing them with real probabilistic data.
This error likelihood data would assist the supervisor in framing the current error using concrete
measures, as opposed to subjective, heuristic-based judgments, which can lead to judgment
errors. The error likelihood data could be collected by the automated decision-support tool and
presented to the supervisor as part of an organized display. The likelihood data could then be
aggregated with other available system cues to guide the supervisor in identifying the most likely
source of error.
This compilation of error probabilities is similar to the Probability Risk Assessment (PRA)
approach (Kirwan, 1992), or the more focused Human Reliability Assessment (HRA) approach
(Gertman & Blackman, 1994), where the likelihood of potential system or human failures is
quantified and used to predict how frequently each event will occur. These approaches are used
to assess the safety of a system, often before the system has been constructed, and therefore, the
error likelihood values are usually best estimates. For the envisioned decision-support tool in the
alternative checklist, the error likelihoods could be derived from historical error occurrence data,
providing a more accurate picture of the actual error landscape. A description of the algorithm
that would be needed to collect, analyze and calculate these error likelihoods is outside the
current scope of this research.
Even if accurate probabilistic data is collected and provided as part of the decision-support tool,
humans are poor at interpreting probabilistic information (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). If error
likelihood data were to be included in the alternative checklist system as part of a decision-
support tool during error identification, an intuitive display method of presenting that
information to the human supervisor would need to be developed. The following subsection
discusses the benefits of such a graphical representation, as well as potential options for
representing the error likelihood data.
2.6.3. Visualization of error likelihoods
In order to prevent potential errors in reasoning resulting from the utilization of decision-making
heuristics, a decision-aid tool incorporating probabilistic data could be developed as part of an
alternative checklist. This tool would lend computing power and supply much-needed knowledge
to decision-makers. The need to develop an intuitive decision aid for the supervisor is paramount
to ensure that the addition of probabilistic data to the decision-making task does not overwhelm
the supervisor. As visualizations take advantage of the natural abilities of the human vision
system, they continue to be the best method to communicate data to human operators (Schroeder,
Martin, & Lorensen, 2006).
Visualizations are graphical representations of data or concepts that support decision-making
(Ware, 2004). An appropriately designed visualization minimizes the cognitive complexity of a
task (Guerlain, Jamieson, Bullemer, & Blair, 2002) and takes advantage of ecological perception,
allowing users to directly perceive relationships within presented data (Gibson, 1979). In the
case of probabilistic error data, it is important that users are able to compare and contrast the
relative likelihoods of all possible errors quickly so that they can utilize this information in error
source selection. In developing a graphic to represent the probabilistic error data, two key
characteristics of the data need to be embodied: 1) hierarchical information, conveying the
categorization of errors within a system (e.g., mechanical failures, automation errors, etc.) and,
2) the relative likelihoods of each system error.
Many graphical representations of likelihood data could convey both of these characteristics.
Three options, namely tree structures, treemaps, and multi-level pie charts, are presented below.
Each graphical representation is demonstrated using a generic error hierarchy that groups system
errors into overall categories and subcategories, and includes associated error likelihood data, as
summarized in Table 1.
An example error hierarchy can be demonstrated using the HSC domain of aviation and the
overall error category Landing. This category can be divided into subcategories, including
Mechanical Failure, Fuel Shortage, and Human Error. These subcategories would then include
all related errors; an engine failure would fall into the Mechanical Failure subcategory, while
forgetting to lower landing gear would fall into the Human Error subcategory. Each error during
landing could have an error likelihood associated with it, based on historical event occurrence.
Table 1: Generic error hierarchy with associated likelihood values.
Overall category Subcategories Errors Likelihoods
Error la.1 0.25
Subcategory la Error la.2 0.125
Error la.3 0.0625
Error Ib.1 0.25
Error Category 1 Subcategory lb
Error lb.2 0.125
Subcategory Ic Error lc.1 0.125
Error 1d.1 0.03125
Subcategory ld
Error ld.2 0.03125
Tree structures
The most basic graphical representation for depicting hierarchical data is a tree structure that
starts with the overall error category at the top of the visualization. This root node is broken
down into child nodes, or subcategories of errors, which are then broken down into actual error
types or events. While the example hierarchical structure referenced in Table 1 and graphically
depicted in Figure 5 only contains three levels, there is no limit on the number of levels of data
that can be represented using a tree structure. Tree structures have been used in different tasks
within many different fields, including operations research, computer science, business
management, biology, and linguistics.
While probabilistic data could be textually listed at each node to indicate the likelihood of
occurrence for each error or category of errors, this representation would not intuitively convey
the relative likelihoods of each error and would require data integration and increased mental
workload on the part of the human supervisor. As well, the probabilistic breakdown for all errors
in the overall error category is difficult to discern from such a representation. Due to the required
data integration when using this representation, the tree structure graphic is not a viable option
for the decision-support tool as part of error identification in the alternative checklist.
Figure 5: Decision tree visualization.
Treemaps
A treemap (Human-Computer Interaction Lab, 2003) is a graphical representation that depicts a
hierarchical tree through the repeated subdivisions of a rectangular shape into nested rectangles.
The outer rectangle represents the root of the tree, or the overall error category. This rectangle is
divided into its children, or error subcategories, which can then be divided into error events or
sources. Once again, while the example hierarchy from Table 1 has only three levels, this
division of rectangles could continue, and multiple levels of data could be conveyed. As each
further layer of data subdivides the space even firther, however, there often needs to be a limit
on the number of levels of data depicted. Treemaps have been commonly utilized in the fields of
business and portfolio management for presenting both high-level overviews and low-level
details of stock market activity (Cable, Ordonez, Chintalapani, & Plaisant, 2004; Smart Money,
2010).
In a treemap, each node or rectangle has an area proportional to a specific dimension of the data.
For the generic error hierarchy data from Table 1, this dimension would be the associated error
likelihood data, with the size of each rectangle representing the probability associated with each
system error. By using object size to represent magnitude (in this case likelihood), the human
observer can directly perceive that the larger rectangle is greater than the smaller rectangle, and
therefore, immediately comprehend the likelihood data being conveyed (Guerlain et al., 2002).
The treemap resulting from the generic hierarchy data is shown in Figure 6. As both the
hierarchical and likelihood aspects of the error data can be depicted using this graphical
representation, it is a potential option for the error identification support tool.
Figure 6: Treemap visualization.
Multi-level pie charts
In the multi-level pie chart depiction (Andrews & Heidegger, 1998; Stasko, Catrambone,
Guzdial, & McDonald, 2000), the root of the hierarchical tree, or overall error category, is shown
as the center of a pie chart. The next level of the tree, the error subcategories, is shown as the
first layer of the pie chart, with the final layer of the pie chart representing the error events or
sources. As with the other graphical representations, the pie chart graphic is capable of showing
many hierarchical layers of data, but has been limited to three in the generic error hierarchy used
for example purposes (Table 1). Like the tree structure, the pie chart graphic grows outwards
with the addition of layers, unlike the treemap. The pie chart graphic is similar to the treemap
representation, however, in that it inherently conveys a further dimension of the data:
proportionality. In the case of the error data, this proportionality is likelihood. Each layer of the
pie chart graphic can be seen as representing 100 percent probability, and therefore, the size of
each error slice in the pie chart is directly proportional to its error likelihood. Once again, by
representing magnitude (or likelihood) data through the size of the object, the human observer
can directly perceive this information (Guerlain et al., 2002).
The pie chart graphic resulting from the generic hierarchy data is shown in Figure 7. As both the
hierarchical and likelihood aspects of the error data can be depicted using this graphical
representation, it is a potential option for the error identification support tool.
1.1 2a.
1 d
1 b12
1aa,
1 b. 1 1a.3
Figure 7: Multi-level pie chart visualization.
Selection of visualization
It is vital that probabilistic data is presented graphically in order for the data to be intuitively
understood by humans. Of the three graphical representations considered, only treemaps and
multi-level pie charts can represent both properties of the error likelihood data in a manner that
does not cause undue mental workload on the human supervisor. However, the multi-level pie
chart has a representational advantage over the treemap graphic: the ease with which it can be
scaled for single or multiple layers of data. With the pie chart, additional layers of data are added
by attaching an additional external ring to the pie chart (i.e., the graphic begins with a central
circle and builds out from this central point). With the treemap visualization, additional layers of
data are added by further compartmentalizing an overall rectangle (i.e., the graphic begins with
an external rectangle and builds in from this outer point). Due to this inherent property of the
treemap representation, individual data points can become small and difficult to comprehend
with the addition of further data layers, as can already be seen in Figure 6.
Due to this identified disadvantage, treemaps will not be considered as a potential visualization
method for the likelihood data in this effort. Therefore, the pie chart graphic is the best method
of visualizing this data. The pie chart could be included as part of an alternative checklist that
supports human supervisors in SMU domains during error resolution.
2.7. Summary
Three HSC domain attributes (domain predictability, sensor reliability, time availability) were
identified that can be used to classify the needs of human supervisors during error identification
in emergency events. Combining these into an attribute model for checklist design, it was
identified that few HSC domains are suited to error resolution using traditional checklist tools. In
order to properly support error resolution in domains not suited to traditional checklist use,
including SMU environments, an alternative checklist must be developed. The design of this new
checklist is discussed in the next chapter.
In this chapter, design considerations for this new checklist were discussed, including the roles of
the human and of automation during error identification in the new checklist, with the
determination that the automation should be responsible for organizing useful diagnostic data for
error identification, while the human supervisor should be responsible for identification and
selection of the error source. The information collected, organized, and presented by an
automated decision-support tool was also considered, leading to the decision that probabilistic
error likelihood data should be used to support supervisors during identification of an error
source. Finally, methods of graphically depicting the error likelihood data were evaluated, with
the multi-level pie chart representation found to be the most suitable depiction for use in the
checklist, as it can convey both the hierarchical and proportional characteristics of the likelihood
information.
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Chapter 3. GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist
This chapter discusses the development of the new error resolution checklist tool. To overcome
uncertainty and data inaccuracy, this new checklist includes probabilistic error data to guide the
user in the error identification process, and a traditional serial presentation of steps to recover
from the identified error. The new error resolution system was termed the GUIDER (Graphical
User Interface for Directed Error Recovery) Probabilistic Checklist. The format of the two
Probabilistic Checklist components, error identification and error recovery, is detailed.
Operations in current U.S. Army warehouse environments is described, as well as how these
environments could change with the introduction of autonomous forklifts. A prototype design of
the checklist for the autonomous forklift domain, termed the Error Identification and Recovery
(EIR) display, is developed to use in testing of the new checklist tool. The GUIDER Probabilistic
Checklist is then characterized using the Checklist Attribute Model (CAM) presented in Section
2.5. Two HSC domains are analyzed using CAM in order to predict the appropriate checklist,
GUIDER or traditional, for the environment. First, a commercial aviation environment is
analyzed, and second, the autonomous forklift domain is analyzed. These analyses are used as a
basis to form hypotheses for the human performance experiment discussed in Chapter 4.
3.1. Error identification
When a failure occurs in an HSC system, it is critical that the source of the error is identified as
quickly as possible so that error recovery can begin and the system can be transitioned back to an
operational state. This not only ensures that efficiency in the system is maintained, but also that
the probability of threats to human safety posed by system errors is reduced. To aid the human
supervisor in SMU domains, it was deemed that a decision-support tool incorporating
probabilistic error data should be included in the error identification portion of the new checklist
tool, in order to support the selection of the error source. To intuitively convey the error
likelihood data to the high-level supervisor, a graphical decision aid was deemed necessary. Of
the possibilities evaluated in Section 2.6.3, the pie chart graphic was selected over the other
graphical representations.
In the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist, error identification will be performed using various
information sources. As in traditional error resolution checklists, feedback concerning the current
state of the system would be provided through system sensors. Supplementing this feedback will
be the graphical decision aid conveying error likelihood data, as well as the supervisor's situation
awareness of the present system state. This combination of data should contribute to more
effective error identification under the uncertain conditions of the SMU domain, with the error
likelihood data, and the pie chart representation of this data, overcoming many negative
consequences related to human judgment under uncertainty, which was discussed in Section
2.6.2.
3.2. Error recovery
Once the supervisor has selected an error from the error identification portion of the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist, error resolution will transition to error recovery. This portion of the
checklist would consist of a traditional serial presentation of the recovery steps specific to the
identified error. As the domain predictability, sensor reliability, and time availability attributes of
HSC domains only impact the error identification portion of error resolution, the error recovery
methodology used in traditional HSC checklists can be used in the new error resolution tool
designed for SMU domains.
If the human supervisor identifies the error source correctly and the system failure is successfully
resolved, the system would shift back to normal operations. If the error was incorrectly
identified, however, and the recovery steps do not resolve the system failure, the error resolution
process would shift back to the error identification portion of the GUIDER Probabilistic
Checklist. The human supervisor would then be required to identify an alternative error source,
continuing the process until the failure state has been resolved.
3.3. Application: Robotic forklift checklist
Military distribution warehouses, referred to in the U.S. Army as an SSA (Supply Support
Activity) warehouse, store and maintain items (packed together into pallets) required for field
operations. While manually driven forklifts are currently used to transport materials within the
SSA, a current project at MIT is proposing the introduction of autonomous forklifts into this
domain. A background of the current SSA environment and an introduction to the autonomous
forklift project are presented below. In addition, a prototype version of the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist, termed the Error Identification and Recovery (EIR) display, is developed
for the domain.
3.3.1. Current SSA operations
Pallets are transported between the different areas of the SSA environment, depicted in Figure 8,
using manually operated forklifts. Pallets arrive in the SSA via truck bed in a reception area
(Figure 9), are moved to a bulk lot (Figure 10), and get transported to the pickup area when
customers arrive for requested items (Figure 11). In order to run the warehouse environment
efficiently, multiple manually operated forklifts are used to move pallets. Currently, a high-level
human supervisor in the system is responsible for monitoring human operators and maintaining
efficiency. The supervisor does not have access to real-time system data, however, such as
current locations of inventory, forklifts, or human operators, and performs monitoring duties by
moving around the different areas of the SSA and observing operations.
Errors in current SSA systems predominantly revolve around the inventory stored in the
warehouse, which is not tracked automatically using a Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID)
system, but is instead manually tracked through SSA personnel. When inventory arrives at the
SSA, human operators manually enter the inventory into a database system and then it is placed
in bulk storage until the customer arrives for pick up. Every morning, a single employee also
records all current items in the bulk area of the SSA and updates this information on a large
summary board (Figure 12).
Using this inventory process, errors are common. Receiving trucks arriving at the wrong SSA are
unloaded without verifying the contents of the shipment. When the items are processed, the
mistake is realized and the items need to be reloaded onto the truck bed and shipped to the
correct location. Items are also misplaced and cannot be located when the customer arrives. Both
of these errors, while not compromising system safety, negatively impact the efficiency of the
SSA, as well as customer opinion of the operation.
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Figure 8: Notional layout of a U.S. Army SSA.
Figure 9: Truck delivering pallets of materials to receiving area of an SSA.
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Figure 10: Bulk storage of materials in an SSA.
Figure 11: Customer vehicles waiting to receive requested materials from SSA.
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Figure 12: Tracking of items located in bulk area of SSA.
3.3.2.SSA domain with autonomous forklifts
Due to the location of some SSAs in active warzones, as well as a first step towards increased
efficiency in the warehouse environment, a group of researchers at MIT are building an
autonomous forklift that will replace the manually operated forklifts that are currently employed
in the SSA domain (Chandler, 2009). This autonomous forklift project hopes to introduce
unmanned robotic forklifts (RFs) into military equipment distribution warehouses and has the
potential to streamline activities in these complex and sometimes hostile environments. It is
envisioned that the RFs will move pallets within the SSA environment based on directions from
ground-level human operators working alongside, and interacting with, the RFs. A human
supervisor will also be included in the SSA environment to perform real-time monitoring of both
RFs and human operators, to carry out planning and scheduling for the system entities, and to
resolve system failures. The three distinct entities that would operate within this envisioned
robotic SSA are shown in Figure 13. The following subsections discuss the requirements for
each of these entities in the autonomous forklift environment.
Ground-Level Human Operator
Hkh-evel Human Supervisor
Figure 13: Entities operating within the forklift domain.
Robotic forklifts
In order to accomplish the pallet pickup and delivery task, the RFs would need to have a number
of capabilities. These include (Walter, 2009):
e Detecting pallets with variable structure and load
- Inferring the geometry of a priori unknown trucks
e Avoiding obstacles within the SSA
e Retaining a common world model of the SSA
e Safely and smoothly interacting with human operators in the environment
To meet these needs, the prototype RF (altered Toyota 3-ton forklifts) has been outfitted with
Sick* (http://www.sick.com/) LIDARs for sensing objects, Hokuyo* (http://www.hokuyo-
aut.jp/) LIDARs for detecting pallets and trucks, four cameras (facing forward, backward, right,
and left) for human operator and high-level supervisor situation awareness, and Light-Emitting
Diodes (LED) signs to indicate the current task the RF is undertaking for the benefit of nearby
human operators. Further modifications to the forklift are expected in order to achieve higher
reasoning levels by the RF, cooperative task allocation among multiple RFs, and localization
within an environment without the use of GPS (Global Positioning System) (Walter, 2009).
Human operators
The role of human operators within the SSA would be to direct the RFs within the warehouse
environment. This direction would be given using a handheld tablet PC, allowing the human
operators to circle target pallets in the environment using the tablet touch screen and stylus. An
example screenshot of the tablet PC can be seen in Figure 14, with a pallet circled. Once an RF
has picked up a pallet, the operator would circle a drop-off location (e.g., in bulk storage if the
item has just arrived at the SSA or in the issue area if a customer has arrived for an item). It is
envisioned that operators would also give directions through voice commands and gesturing.
Figure 14: Tablet PC user interface for directing the RF in SSA.
Human supervisor .
The human supervisor would be responsible for monitoring the RFs and the human operators
working within the SSA warehouse environment. The supervisor would be responsible for high-
level tracking of system entities, planning and scheduling tasks, and error resolution. The needs
of the high-level supervisor for this final task would be met through the Error Identification and
Recovery (EIR) display, which would allow the supervisor to identify an error in the system,
recover from the identified error, and transition the SSA back into an operational state. This EIR
display would need to incorporate a checklist system to assist the supervisor through the error
resolution task.
The envisioned SSA of the future, incorporating autonomous forklifts, has many of the
characteristics of an SMU domain. There would be multiple unmanned forklifts, human
operators, and potentially manned forklifts driven by the human operators in this shared
environment. The unmanned forklifts and human operators would work within close proximity
of one another. The result would be a high-level of complexity, due to the large number of
potential interactions within the environment. Sensor reliability would also be a concern, as the
forklifts would be operated in an environment where weather, blowing sand, and militant actions
could negatively impact sensor accuracy. As this envisioned SSA is representative of an SMU
domain, it was selected as a representative environment for demonstrating the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist.
3.3.3. Sources of error
The first step of applying a checklist to a domain is to identify all potential errors within the
environment. This step was undertaken for the representative domain, with the identification of
all errors that could occur in robotic forklift field operations. An error model was developed that
grouped system errors by functional step or point of occurrence in pallet pickup and delivery
(Table 2). Seven distinct steps were identified in the functional process that involved a human
operator summoning a robotic forklift to pick-up a pallet in the receiving area of the SSA (Figure
8) and delivering it to the bulk lot:
e Summon: Human operator calls an RF to the reception area to begin task.
e Approach truck: RF approaches truck that is carrying target pallet.
- Approach pallet: RF zones in on the location of the target pallet on the truck.
e Pick up pallet: RF inserts tines into pallet slots and lifts pallet off of the truck.
e Transport pallet: RF transports pallet to location designated by the human operator.
e Unload pallet: RF lowers pallet into drop-off location and removes tines from pallet slots.
e Withdraw: RF withdraws from drop-off location and waits for further instructions.
Table 2: Summary of potential errors in robotic forklift field operations.
Functional Step (FS) Errors
-Voice command misunderstood by forklift
Summon -Gesture command misunderstood by forklift
-Forklift does not receive command
-Mechanical failure
-Operator designates path to wrong truck
Approach truck -Forklift takes wrong path
-Forklift path blocked
-Mechanical failure
-Operator designates wrong pallet
-Operator designates multiple pallets
-Operator designates non-pallet
-Operator designates pallet slots incorrectly
Approach pallet -Forklift detects wrong pallet
-Forklift detects non-pallet
-Forklift cannot detect pallet slots
-Forklift path blocked
-Mechanical failure
-Forklift cannot find pallet slots
Pick up pallet -Pallet too heavy
-Forklift picks up wrong pallet
-Mechanical failure
-Operator designates path to wrong location
-Forklift takes wrong path
Transport pallet -Obstacle in approach path
-Forklift drops pallet/distribution unstable
-Forklift transports wrong pallet
-Mechanical failure
-Obstacle in unloading location
-Forklift cannot unload pallet
Unload pallet -Forklift unloads pallet incorrectly
-Forklift drops off wrong pallet
-Mechanical failure
Withdraw -Obstacle in withdraw path
-Mechanical failure
There are a number of distinct errors, as can be seen in Table 2, that could occur during each of
the seven functional steps. These errors could result from forklift failure, human error, or as a
result of an interaction between the two entities (RFs and operators). To limit the scope, only
those errors that could occur during the Approach Pallet functional step were considered for the
development of the EIR display for the forklift domain. There are nine errors that were identified
at this functional step, with the errors grouped into four categories:
1) Pallet identification
- Operator designates wrong pallet: Using the tablet PC, the operator identifies an incorrect
pallet for pickup. The result is the RF approaching the wrong pallet.
- Operator designates multiple pallets: Using the tablet PC, the operator identifies multiple
pallets for pickup. The result is uncertainty as to which pallet the RF should pickup.
- Operator designates non-pallet: Using the tablet PC, the operator identifies an object for
pickup that is not a pallet. The result is the RF approaching the wrong object.
- Forklift detects wrong pallet: While the operator identifies the correct pallet, the forklift
approaches the wrong pallet.
- Forklift detects non-pallet: While the operator identifies the correct pallet, the forklift
approaches an object for pickup that is not a pallet.
2) Slot identification
- Operator designates pallet slots incorrectly: Using the tablet PC, the operator incorrectly
identifies the two slots of the pallet. As a result, it may not be possible for the RF to insert
its tines into the pallet slots.
- Forklift cannot detect pallet slots: While the operator correctly identifies the two pallet
slots, the forklift cannot detect the slots.
3) Obstacle
- Forklift path blocked: An object blocks the path of the forklift during pallet approach.
4) Mechanical failure
- Forklift mechanical failure could occur during any step of the pallet pickup and delivery
process. For simplicity in design of the EIR display, motor failure and structural failure
(e.g., wheel damage, forklift frame damage) were considered as the primary sources of
mechanical failures.
3.3.4. The GUIDER representation
To demonstrate the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist for error identification, the approach pallet
functional step was chosen. The approach pallet step involves the forklift moving toward a pallet
and inserting its tines into the pallet slots. A probabilistic error tree (Figure 15) was developed to
attach likelihood data to each of the ten error sources that could occur during the approach pallet
step, with each of the errors grouped into the four categories presented in Section 3.3.3. As the
autonomous forklift domain is still in development, historical probability data is not available.
Instead, preliminary estimates were chosen for the ten possible errors.
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Figure 15: Probabilistic error tree summarizing the potential forklift errors.
This probabilistic decision tree was then transformed into a more intuitive graphical form,
adapting the decision tree into the pie chart graphic presented in Section 2.6.3, simultaneously
conveying to the supervisor both the hierarchical structure of the data and the relative likelihood
of occurrence of each possible error source during an error event (Figure 16). The graphic,
appearing when the forklift encounters an error, summarizes all possible error sources at the
current functional step. The current functional step (pallet approach) is displayed in the center of
the GUIDER graphic. The high-level error categories at this stage are shown in the next ring of
the graphic, with their portion of the pie chart equivalent to the combined probabilistic
occurrence of all errors in that category. Finally, each individual error is shown in the outermost
ring, with individual likelihood data conveyed through the overall portion of the full pie chart.
Figure 16: GUIDER representation of probabilistic error tree.
In order to utilize the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist within the autonomous forklift domain,
the error resolution tool needed to be incorporated into an EIR display. This display would be a
primary component of a decision-support system for the high-level supervisor operating within
the forklift environment. A prototype version of the EIR display is discussed in the next
subsection.
3.3.5. Error Identification and Recovery (EIR) display
GUIDER was incorporated into an EIR display as part of a decision-support tool for supervisors
in the robotic forklift domain. This EIR display allows the supervisor to track error occurrences
for each unmanned forklift, identify the source of the error, and recover from the error.
The identification screen of the interface consists of the following six components (Figure 17):
1. Forklift tabs that allow the supervisor to select which forklift information he would like
to view in the interface. Once a forklift has been selected, the other screen components
would be specific to that selected forklift. In Figure 17, the supervisor is currently
viewing information concerning Robotic Forklift 1 (RF1).
2. Forklift View, which provides the supervisor with ground level perspective of the RF
domain through the real-time camera on the forklift. Each forklift is outfitted with four
cameras: front, right, back, and left, with the Forklift View always showing the footage
from the front camera. In Figure 17, the Forklift View shows a pallet, outlined in blue,
which has been identified by the forklift.
3. Operator View, which shows the supervisor the current view of the handheld operator
tablet used to control the forklift. This view is a combination of one of the four cameras
on the forklift (the current view is selected by the human operator), as well as any
annotations that have been made to the view using the tablet stylus. In Figure 17, the
operator is currently monitoring the left camera on the forklift.
4. Identification portion of GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist. In Figure 17, multiple pallets
designated is the error selected in the GUIDER pie chart graphic.
5. Additional diagnostic tests (e.g., Check Operator Tablet) to confirm or refute error
sources. In Figure 17, the diagnostic tests related to multiple pallets designated are
present.
6. Function bar indicating process the forklift is in during the pickup/delivery phase. In
Figure 17, RF1 is currently undertaking the approach pallet functional step.
The recovery screen of the interface consists of the following five components, many identical to
those of the identification screen (Figure 18):
1. Forklift tabs that allow the supervisor to select which forklift information he would like
to view in the interface.
2. Forklift View, which gives the supervisor ground level perspective of the robotic forklift
domain through the real-time camera on the forklift.
3. Operator View, which shows the supervisor the current view of the handheld tablet used
to control the forklift.
4. Recovery portion of GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist. In Figure 18, the recovery
checklist for multiple pallets designated is shown.
5. Function bar indicating process the forklift is in during the pickup/delivery phase.
Figure 17: Identification screen in Error Identification and Recovery (EIR) display.
Figure 18: Recovery screen in Error Identification and Recovery (EIR) display.
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When an error occurs in the robotic forklift domain, the error is indicated in the EIR display in
four ways:
1. The tab representing the forklift experiencing the error changes to red (Component 1 in
Figure 17).
2. The functional step that the forklift was undertaking when the error occurred is
highlighted in red (Component 6 in Figure 17).
3. The source of error suggested by the system through state sensors is displayed
(Component 4 in Figure 17).
4. The source of error suggested by the system is highlighted in yellow in the GUIDER
graphic (Component 4 in Figure 17).
As the information provided by system sensors may not be accurate, the human supervisor has
two options available: 1) to confirm the error source suggested by the system sensors, or 2) to
refute this suggestion and select a different error source. If the supervisor agrees with the error
suggested by the system, error resolution begins immediately by confirming the error source.
The error resolution process would then shift to error recovery. It is possible, however, that
information available to the supervisor does not coincide with the suggested error source. This
inconsistency could be due to unpredictability in the SMU domain or inaccurate sensor feedback.
For example, blown sand in the environment, which is likely to be an operational factor for the
RF in current war zones (e.g., Iraq, Afghanistan), could impact LIDAR performance and make
the detection of pallets within the forklift domain unreliable.
The human supervisor can use the information included in the EIR interface to identify the
source of error. On the left of the display, real time forklift and operator views are included to
supply the supervisor with additional information concerning the cause of the error (Components
2 and 3 in Figure 17). A second source of information is the GUIDER pie chart graphic, which
summarizes all possible errors that could be the source of the failure, as well as their likelihood
of occurrence (Component 4 in Figure 17). If the suggested error has a very small likelihood, the
supervisor may be unwilling to accept the suggested error source as the true error source.
Moreover, the supervisor may have information not available to the system, such as unusual
environmental conditions (e.g., muddy areas). Finally, once an error has been selected using the
pie chart graphic, diagnostic tests, such as checking the pallet identification number (to verify if
the identified pallet is the target pallet) and current position of the forklift in the domain (to
compare this position to the location of the target pallet) are available to provide additional
information to either confirm or refute the selected error source (Component 5 in Figure 17).
To illustrate an example where disagreement between supervisor and the RF sensor system could
occur, consider the situation where the sensors suggest that multiple pallets have been designated
for pickup, as opposed to a single pallet. The EIR interface for such a situation is shown in Figure
19.
Figure 19: Multiple pallets designated suggested by system as error source.
The supervisor, after performing the further diagnostic test of viewing the operator tablet (Figure
20), might instead decide that the actual source of error is that the human operator has circled the
target pallet incompletely. The supervisor would therefore disagree with the system suggestion
and instead conclude that a non-pallet designation has occurred (Figure 21). By clicking
CONFIRM, the error resolution process would proceed to error recovery for the non-pallet
designation error. The associated recovery screen of the EIR interface is shown in Figure 22.
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Pallet designation
/> circle incomplete
Figure 20: Diagnostic test inspecting Operator Tablet view.
Figure 21: Non-pallet designated selected as error source.
Figure 22: GUIDER incorporated into Error Identification and Recovery (EIR) display.
The human supervisor would then complete the required recovery steps to return the system to
an operational state. For the non-pallet designated error, these steps could include the supervisor
sending instructions to the closest operator to re-designate the target pallet. If the recovery steps
resolve the system failure, the supervisor correctly identified the error. If the failure persists, the
supervisor incorrectly identified the error and reiteration of the error identification process would
be required.
3.4. Revised Checklist Attribute Model (CAM)
The GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist was designed to meet the needs of error resolution within
SMU domains. Therefore, the features of the checklist make it applicable for the following
domain attributes:
Low Domain Predictability (LDP): SMU domains are intentional environments (Section
2.1.2) that are highly complex and uncertain. Therefore, SMU domains could benefit
from a combination of contextual system data and supervisor perspective to overcome
uncertainty during error identification, which is the premise of the probabilistic checklist.
* Low Sensor Reliability (LSR): The knowledge of the supervisor can guide the error
resolution process, instead of error resolution being solely dependent on the sensor
information being received by the system, which is imprecise.
e Low Time Availability (LTA): If a domain has a high level of uncertainty and
complexity, decision-support could help to streamline the error identification process,
making the probabilistic checklist a viable option when there is low time available for
resolving the failure.
Considering the characteristics of traditional checklists and the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist,
the CAM presented in Section 2.5.4 (Figure 4) can be revised to include checklist tool
suggestions (Figure 23); the top of the tetrahedron would represent the end of the spectrum best
suited to traditional checklist systems, and the base of the tetrahedron would represent the end of
the spectrum best suited to the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist. The middle of the tetrahedron
(or the medium part of the attribute scale) would remain a gray zone that does not allow for the
immediate classification of an HSC domain.
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Figure 23: Revised Checklist Attribute Model (CAM).
As a result of this revision, classification of an HSC domain using CAM would allow a system
designer to predict the best checklist tool for that domain. If a majority of the classifications were
low (at least two of the three ratings on the domain attribute scale are, low), the GUIDER
. ... . .....
Probabilistic Checklist would be recommended. If the majority of the classifications were high,
the Traditional Checklist would be recommended. If the majority of the classifications were
medium, or each domain attribute was rated uniquely (i.e. one low rating, one medium rating,
one high rating), the recommendation would be unclear.
This rating technique, while intuitive, is a subjective classification method that would need
validation before utilization as part of an error resolution design process. The classification of
existing HSC domains using CAM could assist in this validation process. The best checklist tool
for error resolution within a domain could be hypothesized through CAM classification, with this
hypothesis either accepted or rejected through experimental testing within a simulated version of
the environment. If error resolution performance were best using the predicted checklist tool,
there would be further evidence to validate CAM. On the other hand, if error resolution
performance were best using the tool not predicted, there would be evidence against the validity
of CAM.
Classifications for two example HSC domains are presented in the following section to
demonstrate the use of CAM. These classifications are then used as the basis for the formation of
hypotheses in a human performance experiment to test the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist.
3.5. Example domain classifications
Two representative HSC domains were examined to demonstrate the use of CAM (Figure 23) for
checklist selection. The first domain is a traditional system: commercial aviation. The second
domain is the robotic forklift SMU environment.
3.5.1. Commercial aviation
The domain of commercial aviation was selected because it has many contrasting characteristics
with SMU domains. Traditional checklists have been used in commercial aviation for decades
and while accidents resulting from checklist errors still occur, these assistive devices continue to
be the primary method used for error resolution. Given the three previously identified domain
attributes and applying them to commercial aviation, a traditional checklist is shown to be the
appropriate checklist selection.
Domain predictability
The commercial aviation domain is an example of a generally causal-system in that the system
has clear constraints, the behavior of the system is well understood, and there is a clear feedback
loop between the state of the system and the pilot supervising the flight. As a result of these clear
boundaries, the aircraft almost always acts and responds in an expected manner. It should be
noted, however, that there might be unexpected environmental factors that may act on the
system, including severe weather and other objects in flight (birds, aircraft). These may result in
unpredictable system behavior, and therefore impact human performance in this environment. As
commercial aircrafts are rarely impacted by unpredictable environmental factors, it is concluded
that this domain has high domain predictability (HDP).
Sensor reliability
In the domain of commercial aviation, there is limited uncertainty associated with the sensor data
provided to the pilot. Due to the clear boundaries of the system and high reliability of sensors, it
is possible to provide feedback data to the pilot for almost all system components for most
situations. These sensors have been refined over the last half-century, resulting in high-
functioning and reliable equipment systems (Dismukes, Berman, & Loukopoulos, 2007). As a
direct result, aircraft accidents have decreased substantially. We can conclude that the sensor
reliability in commercial aircraft systems is very reliable. Using the domain attribute scale, it is
evaluated as having high sensor reliability (HSR).
Time availability
The low time availability of the commercial aviation domain is immediately apparent, as an
aircraft accident can result in not only the loss of the system, which is quite costly, but also the
passengers. If the proper steps are not followed during aircraft operation, or error events are not
resolved in a timely manner, serious consequences can result. It should be noted, however, that
while it is vital that errors in commercial aviation be resolved quickly, the time available for
error resolution could vary greatly between error events. It can be concluded that error resolution
in the commercial aviation domain is almost always time critical, as system and operator safety
could be compromised. Using the determinant scale in Figure 23, it is evaluated as having low
time availability (LTA).
Overall evaluation
Receiving two high ratings for domain predictability and sensor reliability, using the checklist
classification model we can form the hypothesis that a traditional checklist system will better aid
error recovery in the HSC domain of commercial aviation.
3.5.2. Forklift domain
A high-level supervisor in the robotic forklift domain will be responsible for monitoring human
and autonomous entities in the system, maximizing workflow efficiencies, and monitoring for
and recovering from system errors. An examination of the domain using the identified attributes
can help to determine which checklist style is most appropriate for this system.
Domain predictability
The robotic forklift domain falls into the general classification of an intentional command and
control environment, with unclear constraints. The domain has dynamic entities, both in the form
of human operators and unmanned vehicles, and is highly influenced by unforeseen
environmental factors present in war environments. Moreover, human decision-makers, whose
behavior is guided by decision-making heuristics, impact these domains. With such unclear
system boundaries, the overall system response would be quite variable for unexpected events.
Using the domain attribute scale, it can be concluded that the robotic forklift domain has low
domain predictability (LDP).
Sensor reliability
In the robotic forklift domain, many sensors will be required to guide the forklift during the
pallet pickup and delivery process, as well as provide feedback to the supervisor during this task.
For example, during pallet approach, sensors will be needed that locate the pallet, identify the
pallet, locate the slots of the pallet, and guide the forklift tines into those pallet slots. In addition,
other sensors would be required to operate at all times, such as obstacle detectors and sensors
that monitor for mechanical and system failures.
Due to the system having unclear boundaries and a wide range of environmental factors acting
on it, it is impossible to incorporate sensors to provide feedback information for all system
entities for all situations. The operating conditions of the military warehouse environment also
complicate information feedback loops. In war zones, weather, uneven ground, and militant
actions may result in sensors becoming damaged or inoperable, leading to inaccurate data being
communicated to the supervisor.
Due to the difficult operating conditions and unclear boundaries of the robotic forklift domain,
sensor reliability may be compromised. Using the domain attribute scale, this domain is
evaluated as having low sensor reliability (LSR).
Time availability
In the robotic forklift domain, it is important that orders are fulfilled in a timely manner.
Delivery trucks must be unloaded efficiently, the unloaded pallets taken from the reception area
and moved into bulk lot storage promptly, and with quick delivery to customers. While it is
important for time inefficiencies to be avoided, errors that cause system delay seldom impact
overall system health or operator safety if they are not resolved immediately. Instead, these
errors will likely lead to longer wait times and negative customer feedback. In isolated situations,
however, the efficient movement of equipment may be vital to military operations. In such cases,
quickness of processing becomes more critical.
It can be concluded that error resolution in the robotic forklift domain is usually not time critical
on the order of seconds, although time will occasionally be a factor. Using the determinant scale,
it is evaluated as having medium time availability (MTA).
Overall evaluation
Receiving two low ratings for system predictability and sensor reliability and one medium rating
for time availability, using the checklist classification model we can form the hypothesis that the
GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist system will more effectively assist error identification and
recovery in this SMU domain.
3.6. Summary
The GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist was designed for highly complex and uncertain SMU
domains, supplying the human supervisor with error likelihood data to aid them during the error
identification process. This likelihood data was included in the checklist to provide contextual
information about past system performance, which when combined with the present situation
awareness of the supervisor, could combine to improve error identification. The pie chart graphic
was selected as the graphical representation of the error likelihood information, with the graphic
intuitively conveying the hierarchical and proportional characteristics of the likelihood data.
The GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist was applied to the RF SSA environment as a representative
SMU domain. The GUIDER Checklist, including graphical likelihood representation, was
incorporated into a prototype EIR display. For demonstration purposes, only a small subset of the
potential errors in the RF domain was considered during the development of this EIR interface.
The resulting EIR display included the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist (with pie chart graphic),
video footage from the on-forklift cameras, and a serial presentation of recovery steps once an
error source had been identified and confirmed.
Based on the revised Checklist Attribute Model (CAM), it was determined that the newly
designed GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist could better aid error resolution in an SMU domain
when compared to a traditional checklist. This hypothesis will be tested through a human
performance experiment that is described in the next chapter. In order to test the two error
recovery systems, error scenarios will be simulated using the robotic forklift domain and an EIR
interface developed from the prototype screenshots included in Section 3.3.5.

Chapter 4. Experimental Evaluation
A human performance experiment was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist compared to a more traditional checklist in an SMU environment. The
forklift domain was utilized as a representative SMU domain, with simulated forklift error
scenarios created for the EIR display discussed in Section 3.3.5. This chapter describes the setup
of the experiment, including apparatus used in the simulations, hypotheses, and the experimental
procedure.
4.1. EIR simulation
In order to evaluate research hypotheses through a human performance experiment, a specific
EIR interface was developed and potential error scenarios were simulated. The two components
of the EIR simulation, the simulated error scenarios and the EIR display are described in the
following subsections.
4.1.1. Error scenarios
In order to assess the hypotheses formulated using the Checklist Attribute Model (CAM), which
was presented in Section 3.4, one of the three attributes identified in the model had to be
incorporated into the experiment as an independent variable. By adjusting this variable in
different error scenarios, the predictions of CAM could be verified or refuted. The attribute that
was selected as an independent variable was sensor reliability. This attribute was chosen because
it could be easily varied in the simulated testing conditions utilized for the experiment.
It was decided that the error scenarios would only involve a single robotic forklift (identified as
RF1), and all failures would occur at the approach pallet functional step. The limiting of the
failure to a single process step reduced the potential error sources in the simulated forklift
environment to ten. Each of the ten errors was grouped into one of six system sensor groups. The
potential errors for the simulated scenarios, as well as the associated sensor groups, are
summarized in Table 3.
groups and related pallet approach errors.
Sensor Group Potential Error
Mechanical Frame failure
Motor failure
Obstacle detection Path blocked
Multiple pallets designated
Pallet designation Non-pallet designated
Wrong pallet designated
Pallet detection Non-pallet detected
Wrong pallet detected
Slot designation Incorrect slot designation
Slot detection Slots not detected
Three error scenarios were created to represent each of the three levels of sensor reliability that
were included in CAM: low reliability, medium reliability, and high reliability. The related
reliability level for each sensor group for the three simulated scenarios is shown in Table 4.
Table 4: Sensor reliability levels for simulated error scenarios.
Sensor Group Scenario 1 (Low) Scenario 2 (Medium) Scenario 3 (High)
Mechanical Low High High
Obstacle detection Low Low High
Pallet designation Medium Medium Medium
Pallet detection Low Medium High
Slot designation Low Medium Medium
Slot detection Low Low High
4.1.2. EIR display
The design of the simulated EIR display is based on the prototype EIR interface that was
presented in Section 3.3.5. Two unique simulated displays were used representing: 1) the
GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist, and 2) a Traditional Checklist, which did not include a
decision-support tool to assist the participant through error identification, and instead listed all
potential error sources alphabetically. The adoption of two EIR displays allowed for the testing
Table 3: Sensor
and comparison of the two distinct checklist tools. Both simulated interfaces consisted of six
components:
e Component 1: Forklift tabs that allow the supervisor to select which forklift information
they would like to view in the interface.
e Component 2: Forklift View, which gives the supervisor ground level perspective of the
robotic forklift domain through the real-time camera on the forklift.
e Component 3: Sensor reliability levels (instead of the Operator View that was included in
the original EIR interface).
e Component 4: Error resolution checklist tool (GUIDER or Traditional).
- Component 5: Additional diagnostic tests to confirm or refute error sources.
- Component 6: Process bar indicating process the forklift is in during pickup/delivery.
The EIR interface designed for the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist is shown in Figure 24 and
the EIR interface designed for the Traditional Checklist is shown in Figure 25.
For each simulated error scenario, the EIR display was customized in a number of ways. The
Forklift View (Component 2) was unique to each of the three error scenarios, with the camera
image aiding the participant in developing a fuller perspective of the current system state.
Diagnostic tests were also available for each scenario, providing additional information to
confirm or refute an error source. As part of the sensor feedback to the system, an error source
was suggested to the participant at the top of the error resolution checklist tool (Component 4),
which could be correct or incorrect (Table 5). The accuracy of this suggestion, or the level of
trust that should be placed in this information, was indicated to the participant through the
reliability level of the sensor group responsible for detection of the suggested error source (Table
3). For example, the suggestion of motor failure in Scenario 1 is likely to be inaccurate as the
mechanical sensor group responsible for the detection of that error source has a low reliability
level. As can be seen in Table 5, the only scenario for which the suggested error source and the
true error source matched was Scenario 3, which had predominantly high reliability sensors.
Figure 24: Identification screen, GUIDER Checklist.
Figure 25: Identification screen, Traditional Checklist.
Table 5: Suggested and true error source for each error scenario.
Scenario 1 (Low) Scenario 2 (Medium) Scenario 3 (High)
Suggested Error Motor failure Incorrect slot designation Wrong pallet detected
True Error Slots not detected Wrong pallet designated Wrong pallet detected
The participants were required to aggregate the provided diagnostic information presented in the
error identification portion of the simulated EIR interface to identify what they believed to be the
true source of the system failure. This information included the Forklift View, the sensor
reliability levels, the suggested error based on the sensor feedback, error likelihood information
(GUIDER Checklist only), and the available diagnostic tests. The diagnostic tests provided
additional information to confirm or refute each of the potential error sources. For example, one
diagnostic test available within the EIR display allowed a participant to check the pallet
identification number of the detected pallet against the goal pallet. A second diagnostic test
option allowed a participant to view the operator tablet to see the pallet that was designated by
the operator, as well as the method of designation. The diagnostic test information provided was
identical for both checklist types (GUIDER, Traditional).
Once participants identified an error, they needed to confirm the error selection by clicking on
the CONFIRM button located at the bottom of the GUIDER checklist. Up until the confirmation
of an error, participants could continue to collect diagnostic data for any of the potential error
sources. After clicking CONFIRM, they transitioned into error recovery. In the error recovery
portion of the simulated EIR display, participants were presented with a recovery task that
needed to be completed in order to resolve the identified error. For example, if non-pallet
detected was the confirmed error source, the first step in the recovery checklist would state:
"Forklift 1 path planning software needs to be validated Assign task to." While the error
recovery task was unique to the ten potential error sources, each task needed to be assigned to
one of three operators within the simulated environment: Operator A, Operator B, or Operator C.
A physical printout of the current location of the forklift and operators was provided to the
participants, so that they could determine which operator to assign the task to in the environment,
based on proximity to the failed forklift. This environment map was unique for each of the
simulated error scenarios. The map for Scenario 1 is shown in Figure 26.
Figure 26: Map of forklift environment for Scenario 1.
Once a participant assigned the task to an operator, the assignment would be processed and the
simulation would assess whether the participant had correctly or incorrectly identified the error
source. If participants had selected the incorrect error source, they would be alerted, "Incorrect
error identified. Please try again". This situation is shown in Figure 27 for the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist and in Figure 28 for the Traditional Checklist, with participants
transitioning back into the error identification portion of the checklist by clicking the Reselect
button. If the correct error was selected, participants were alerted, "Error identified' and then
continued to the next simulated error scenario by clicking the Continue to next scenario button.
This situation is shown in Figure 29 for the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist and in Figure 30 for
the Traditional Checklist.
.. .  ...... 
Figure 27: Recovery screen after incorrect confirmation, GUIDER Checklist.
Reselect buttoni
Figure 28: Recovery screen after incorrect confirmation, Traditional Checklist.
Continue to next scenario button\
Figure 29: Recovery screen after correct confirmation, GUIDER Checklist.
Continue to next scenario button-N
Figure 30: Recovery screen after correct confirmation, Traditional Checklist.
4.2. Hypotheses
The Checklist Attribute Model (CAM), presented in Section 3.4 and Figure 23, classifies
traditional checklist systems and the newly designed GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist system by
three HSC domain attributes: domain predictability, sensor reliability, and time availability. If a
domain receives a majority of high ratings on the three domain attribute scales, it is hypothesized
that a traditional checklist system is most appropriate for error resolution within that domain. If a
domain receives a majority of low ratings on the three domain attribute scales, it is instead
hypothesized that the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist system with decision-support during error
identification, is more appropriate. Finally, if a domain receives a majority of medium ratings on
the three domain attribute scales, or a single rating each of low, medium, and high, a hypothesis
as to the best error resolution system cannot be made. As a result of the case study of the forklift
domain (Section 3.5.2), it is hypothesized that the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist is most
appropriate and that gains in performance over a traditional checklist tool would be greatest at
levels of low sensor reliability (LSR).
A human performance experiment tested this hypothesis in terms of participant performance on
the three simulated error scenarios, the cognitive strategy of the participants, and subjective user
feedback concerning the appeal of each error checklist system.
4.2.1. Performance
It was hypothesized that human supervisors would have higher performance in low sensor
reliability HSC domains when using the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist compared to the
Traditional Checklist. Conversely, it was hypothesized that in HSC domains with high sensor
reliability, performance would be better with the Traditional Checklist. In general, it was
hypothesized that performance in high reliability settings would be better than performance in
medium reliability settings, and that performance in medium reliability settings would be better
than performance in low reliability settings.
Performance was measured using two metrics. The first was the number of error confirmations
made before completing an error scenario. An error confirmation was made once the participant
clicked the CONFIRM button on the interface and transitioned into the error recovery portion of
the checklist. This metric evaluated the ability of the participant to combine the diagnostic
information presented in the EIR display to make a correct error diagnosis. As the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist provides error likelihood data that the Traditional Checklist system does
not, it was hypothesized that the error identification process would be improved when using the
GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist under low sensor reliability settings.
The second performance metric was time to complete scenario. This metric was predicted to be
highly correlated with the number of error confirmations made by the participant. This
relationship is evident, as the more incorrect errors confirmed, the longer it would take for the
error scenario to be completed. Therefore, it was hypothesized that time to complete scenario
would be lower when using the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist when compared to the
Traditional Checklist, due to the predicted positive impact of error likelihood data on the error
diagnosis process. The time difference between the two checklist systems would be most
apparent in low sensor reliability settings, where data uncertainty is high, and was predicted to be
undetectable in high sensor reliability settings, where data uncertainty is low.
4.2.2. Cognitive Strategies
It was hypothesized that error-resolving performance in the error scenarios would be improved
when the provided diagnostic information was used to identify and confirm the true error source.
Therefore, a participant that is able to identify the error correctly within one or two error
confirmations is likely to have more fully utilized the diagnostic data than a participant that ends
up selecting many errors before correct selection. In this manner, it could be assumed that the
more time participants spend in the error identification phase before making their first error
confirmation, the more diagnostic data collection that was performed.
It was hypothesized that performance with both the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist and the
Traditional Checklist would be improved when the participant spends more time in error
identification before making the first error confirmation. This hypothesis was evaluated using the
metric, time to first error confirmation. This metric was hypothesized to show greater statistical
difference in the low sensor reliability scenarios where more data uncertainty is present, than in
high reliability settings where there is little to no data uncertainty. It was assumed that this metric
would be negatively correlated with number of error confirmations.
A second metric that assesses error identification strategy is use of diagnostic tests. The use of
diagnostic tests during the error identification process indicates that the human supervisor is
undergoing the process of confirming or refuting an error source, and is presently uncertain
about the true source of the system failure. It was hypothesized that in low reliability settings,
participants that utilize the diagnostic tests more frequently would be more successful during
error identification. Once again, it was assumed that this metric would be negatively correlated
with number of error confirmations.
4.2.3. Subjective feedback
It was hypothesized that participants would prefer the error identification and recovery task when
using the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist, as opposed to the Traditional Checklist. This
prediction was made because the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist would provide more
information to guide the user in identifying the source of a system failure than would the
Traditional Checklist. Therefore, the participant should feel more confident in the error
identification process when utilizing the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist.
It must be noted that as participants only interacted with a single checklist type, a direct
comparison of the two checklists by a single participant could not be made. Therefore, the
subjective user interaction questions were isolated appraisals of the tool that had been used, as
opposed to a contrast of the tools. This is a limitation of the experimental design, and in future
studies, it would be beneficial to have participants utilize each checklist so that a direct
comparison can be made.
4.3. Apparatus
The experimental platform was developed using Sun Microsystems Java programming language.
Java was chosen mainly to leverage its portability property. For the experiment, the simulations
were run on a MacBook Pro (Intel Core 2 Duo, 2.8 GHz, 8GB RAM, 256GB SSD and a 15.2"
monitor) laptop equipped with an Apple Magic Mouse and Altec-Lansing speakers (Figure 31).
Figure 31: Apparatus setup for experiment.
4.4. Participants
Thirty-six computer literate participants between the ages of 18 and 31 were recruited, and were
reimbursed with two movie tickets for their time. The mean age of participants was 22.81 years,
with a standard deviation of 2.92 years. All of the participants were undergraduate students,
graduate students, or researchers at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) and came
from a variety of disciplines, including computer science, business, aerospace, and biomedicine.
Gender of the participants was balanced, with 18 male participants and 18 female participants.
Eight of the participants had utilized some form of checklist in a formal setting, including
checklists for aviation, Air Force satellite operations, and medical environments. A summary of
the descriptive statistics is included in Appendix A.
As the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist is a new conception of error identification and recovery
systems, it was determined that a general user base should first be used to verify the potential of
the new checklist. If positive results are found through this preliminary testing, subject matter
experts could be recruited to evaluate the two checklist systems.
...... . .... . 
4.5. Procedure
The experimental procedure consisted of four parts: pre-experiment interaction, training, error
scenarios, and post-experiment interaction. Each experimental component is discussed in the
following section. The experiment lasted approximately 50 minutes.
4.5.1. Pre-experiment interaction
Upon arrival, participants were asked to fill out the Consent to Participate Form (Appendix B).
After giving consent, participants completed a brief demographic survey documenting age,
gender, previous checklist experience, and video gaming experience (Appendix C). The survey
was conducted online using free online survey software (www.surveymonkey.com), with the
data automatically saved online, organized by participant. Once the survey was finished,
participants progressed into the training portion of the experiment. The time to complete the pre-
experiment component was 5 minutes.
4.5.2. Training
A PowerPoint tutorial was developed for both the Traditional Checklist system and the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist system (Appendix D). The tutorial slides began with an overview of the
autonomous forklift domain, introducing the entities within the system, including forklifts,
human operators, and human supervisor. The tutorial also introduced the components of the EIR
interface and the information contained in the interface that would be helpful to the participant
during the error resolution task. This included the forklift view picture, the reliability level of the
six sensor groups in the forklift domain, the error likelihood data (for those participants in the
GUIDER treatment), and the diagnostic tests for each of the ten potential error sources. In order
to prepare those participants assigned to the GUIDER treatment to understand the pie chart
graphic, four additional slides detailing the error likelihood graphical representation were
included in that tutorial.
Near the end of the tutorial slides, a training video was included. The video was approximately
four minutes in length, and reinforced the information that was presented in the tutorial slides
using an example error scenario and voice over (Appendix E). Interaction with the interface was
demonstrated, as well as the specifics of how the available diagnostic data could be utilized to
pinpoint the error source. The video concluded with the selection of the true error source and
recovery from the identified error.
With the video complete, participants were given final experiment instructions, which described
the number of error scenarios included in the experiment, the goal of the experiment, and a
description of the performance metrics that would be measured. Before beginning the
experimental trials, participants were also given the opportunity to interact with the simulation
through the same error scenario that was used in the training video. Once they felt comfortable
with the system and all lingering questions had been addressed, the experiment began. Overall,
training took approximately 20 minutes to complete.
4.5.3. Error scenarios
At the beginning of each scenario, participants read a contextual background summary
discussing the reliability of sensors in the environment, as well as a summary of recent system
behavior (Figure 32). This background varied for each of the three error scenarios (low
reliability, medium reliability, high reliability), but was identical for each of the two checklist
types (GUIDER, Traditional).
The participants then began the experimental trials. Participants were asked to use the available
information to identify the source of the failure in the system, confirm the error, and recover
from the error by assigning the recovery task to one of three operators working within the forklift
environment. The last task was used to promote cognitive effort during error recovery; there was
no correct operator assignment and the assignments made by participants were not analyzed.
Participants iterated on this process until they had identified the true source of error.
When participants completed a scenario, they transitioned directly into the next scenario. Once
the true error source had been identified for each scenario, the testing portion of the experiment
was complete. For each error scenario, a number of items were tracked and collected in unique
files with CSV format. This information included the time the scenario began, time of error
selections, time and location of diagnostic test selections, the error sources confirmed, time of
error source confirmations, operator assignment to recovery tasks, and whether the error was
correctly or incorrectly identified. The overall time to complete the three error scenarios was 20
minutes.
Figure 32: Contextual background screen for low reliability error scenario.
4.5.4. Post-experiment questionnaire
After completing the three error scenarios, the experiment concluded with the participants
completing a subjective user interaction questionnaire (Appendix F). Once again, this survey was
conducted online using free online survey software (www.surveymonkey.com), and probed
participants about satisfaction with the checklist system, level of confusion, and overall
performance. Workload-related questions were also included, such as mental workload level and
frustration level.
4.6. Experiment design
The experiment was a 2x3 fixed factor design with two independent variables: Checklist System
(GUIDER, Traditional) and Sensor Reliability Level (Low, Medium, High). There were repeated
measures on the Sensor Reliability Level factor. Therefore, participants received three
experimental treatments, undertaking the error resolution task for each reliability level for a
... ...... .... ....  ....   ---- -............  _ ...
single assigned checklist. Participants were randomly assigned to one of the two error recovery
systems and the three trials were randomized (www.randomization.com) and balanced, ensuring
that the order of sensor reliability level was varied (Appendix G).
4.7. Summary of performance metrics
A variety of performance metrics were measured in order to verify or refute the hypotheses
presented in Section 4.2. Each of these metrics is described below:
e Number of error confirmations: The number of errors identified and confirmed by the
participant during the error scenario before recovering from the failure. While there were
only ten errors to select from, this number could be greater than ten if participants re-
confirmed a previously confirmed error source.
e Time to complete scenario: The total time from the start of the scenario (participant
clicking "Begin Scenario" button in contextual background) up until the system error had
been resolved.
e Use of diagnostic tests: The number of diagnostic tests utilized by participants before
their first error confirmation. This metric could range in value from zero (if no diagnostic
checking was performed) to ten (if diagnostic tests for each error source were checked).
This metric was assumed to be an estimate of the amount of probing and information
gathering the participants performed before identifying and confirming their first error
source.
e Time to first error confirmation: The time from the start of the scenario (participant
clicking "Begin Scenario" button in contextual background) up until participants made
their first error confirmation. This metric was assumed to be an estimate of the amount of
probing and information gathering the participants performed before identifying and
confirming their first error source.
e Error resolution strategy: The information source that was emphasized during error
confirmation. This metric was difficult to assess for many of the available information
sources, and was therefore limited to two sources: suggested error and likelihood data. A
participant was counted as basing error confirmation on the suggested error if the first
error confirmation made by the participant matched the suggested error. A participant
was counted as basing error confirmation on likelihood data if the first error confirmation
made by the participant matched the error with the highest likelihood.
Subjective user interaction: Subjective data that was collected using a five-point Likert
scale. There were eight questions on the user interaction questionnaire (Appendix F), and
therefore, eight data points for each participant.
4.8. Summary
An experiment was conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the new error recovery tool,
termed the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist. This experiment consisted of three distinct
simulated errors in the forklift domain, with each scenario varying in the reliability level of
system sensors (low, medium, high). Participants were either assigned to perform the error
resolution tasks using the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist or a Traditional Checklist. When
presented with an error, participants were tasked with identifying the source of the error and
recovering from the error. The metrics used to assess performance were number of error
confirmations and time to complete scenario.
Once the experiment was complete, data had been collected for each of the performance metrics
for all 36 participants. In order to confirm or refute the hypotheses presented in this chapter, the
data needed to be formally analyzed using appropriate inferential statistical tests. The statistical
tests utilized, and the results of those tests, are presented in the next chapter.
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Chapter 5. Results
Statistical analyses were conducted to compare the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist with the
Traditional Checklist within the complex and uncertain autonomous forklift domain. The two
primary dependent variables were: number of error confirmations and time to complete scenario.
As number of error confirmations and time to complete scenario were highly positively
correlated (p = 0.810, p < .001), only the results relating to number of error confirmations are
reported. Secondary performance metrics measured in the experiment were use of diagnostic
tests, time to first error confirmation, error resolution strategy, and subjective checklist
assessment.
An analysis of variance (ANOVA) test was initially utilized for the analyses of the primary
dependent variable data. If the data did not meet normality and homogeneity of variance
assumptions (or the transformation of this data did not meet these assumptions), nonparametric
tests were instead implemented. The effects of gender, age, and video gaming experience were
found to have no significant impact on this performance data, and were therefore excluded from
any further analysis. The results for the first error scenario undertaken by each participant was
excluded from analysis of the primary variable data to limit the impact of learning effects.
Correlations and qualitative analysis of the cognitive strategies were used to discern relationships
between error recovery methodology and the two independent variables (checklist type,
reliability level). Finally, a Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare the user interaction
feedback data obtained for the GUIDER tool and the Traditional tool. An alpha of 0.05 was used
for all statistical tests. It must be noted that due to the high number of statistical tests that were
performed during data analysis, the family-wise alpha value would be much lower than 0.05, and
therefore, tests needed a high level of statistical significance before their results could be
considered meaningful.
For a summary of the collected data, assumption tests, and detailed test results, see Appendix H,
Appendix I, and Appendix J, respectively.
5.1. Number of error confirmations
During the error identification process, participants had to determine which of the ten potential
errors was the source of the failure. Once they believed that they had identified the correct error
source, participants would lock-in this selection by clicking the CONFIRM button at the bottom
of the checklist, transitioning them into error recovery.
The number of error confirmations metric measured the number of error confirmations that were
made by a participant in order to identify the true error source and complete an error scenario.
This count data could range from one, if the participant identified the correct error source on the
first error confirmation, to ten, if the participant identified each of the available error sources
before correctly identifying the true error source. There was also potential for more than ten error
confirmations, if the participant re-identified an already confirmed error source. In the collected
data set this value never exceeded 10, although some participants did repeat certain error
confirmations. An ANOVA analysis was initially employed to analyze the collected data.
Unfortunately, the data did not meet the assumptions of the ANOVA test, and therefore,
nonparametric analysis was utilized. The results of the normality and homogeneity tests are
included in Appendix I.
The Pearson's chi-square test of independence was used to assess whether the number of error
confirmations made in each reliability level, and when using each checklist type, were
independent. For example, the test assessed whether participants differed in their number of error
confirmations when using GUIDER compared to the Traditional tool, or in the low reliability
setting compared to the high reliability setting. There was no significance found between the two
checklist types across all reliability levels (X8,72 = 9.817, p = .278), with the relationship between
number of error confirmations and checklist type graphically depicted in Figure 33. However,
there was significance found between the three reliability levels across both checklist types
(X16,72 = 47.123, p < .001). The relationship between number of error confirmations and
reliability level is graphically depicted in Figure 34.
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As a significant effect of reliability on number of error confirmations was found, it was
necessary to perform further testing to determine the nature of the relationship. The comparison
between the three reliability levels was made using a Wilcoxon Signed Ranks test. A significant
difference was found between the low and high reliability levels (Z = -4.086, p < .001) and the
medium and high reliability levels (Z = -4.143, p < .00 1). No difference was found between the
low and medium reliability levels (Z -1.229, p = .219).
It was also important to assess the differences in number of error confirmations between the two
checklist types at each of the three reliability levels, as it was hypothesized that GUIDER would
result in significantly better performance at the low reliability level compared to the Traditional
tool. The factor level means comparison was performed using a Mann-Whitney U test (mean and
standard deviation data is included in Table 6). The relationship between number of error
confirmations and the interaction of checklist type and reliability level is graphically depicted in
Figure 35.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics for number of error confirmations.
OVERALL Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
Mean 3.14 4.50 1.14
Median 2.00 4.00 1.00
Mode 2 5 1
STDEV 2.26 2.59 0.54
Min 1 1 1
Max 9 10 4
TRADITIONAL CHECKLIST Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
Mean 2.28 5.17 1.11
Median 2.00 5.00 1.00
Mode 2 5 1
STDEV 1.74 2.81 0.32
Min 1 1 1
Max 8 10 2
GUIDER CHECKLIST Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
Mean 4.00 3.83 1.17
Median 4.00 3.50 1.00
Mode 4 4 1
STDEV 2.43 2.23 0.71
Min 1 . 1 1
Max 9 8 4
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Figure 35: Effect of checklist and reliability on number of error confirmations.
A significant difference was detected at the medium reliability level (Z = -2.114, p = .039), with
the GUIDER Checklist resulting in significantly fewer error confirmations in comparison with
the Traditional Checklist. No statistical difference was detected at the low reliability level (Z = -
2.011, p = .052) or the high reliability level (Z = -1.446, p = .514). Full statistical results have
been included in Appendix J.
5.2. Cognitive strategies
The error identification strategies used by participants impacted their performance on the
primary dependent variable, number of error confirmations. The cognitive strategy utilized by
each participant was broken into two categories: information collection during error
identification and information emphasis during error confirmation.
...........
5.2.1. Information collection
Two performance metrics were used to determine how much information participants collected
during the error identification process. The first metric was use of diagnostic tests and the second
metric was time tofirst error confirmation. These metrics are described in Section 4.7.
A Spearman's rank correlation was used to assess the statistical relationship between the metrics
that described the amount of information collected and the primary dependent variable, number
of error confirmations. The metric use of diagnostic tests had a significant negative correlation
with number of error confirmations in the low reliability scenario (p = -0.565, p = .004). This
indicated that as diagnostic test use increased, the number of errors confirmed by participants
decreased. In the high reliability scenario, however, there was a significant positive correlation
(p = 0.507, p = 0.0 12), indicating that the number of error confirmations rose with the increased
use of diagnostic tests. Therefore, those participants that collected more data performed worse
than those participants that did little data collection under the high reliability condition. No
significant correlation was found in the medium reliability scenario (p = -0.129, p = .547).
Significant correlations were also found between time to first error confirmation and number of
error confirmations. In the low reliability scenario, there was a significant negative correlation
(p = -0.538, p = .007), while in the high reliability scenario there was a trend towards a positive
correlation (p = 0.349, p = .095). In other words, spending more time collecting diagnostic data
had a positive impact in the low reliability condition, but negatively impacted performance in the
high reliability condition. Once again, there was no significant correlation found at the medium
reliability level (p = -0.172, p = .422). All associated statistical tests are included in Appendix J.
5.2.2. Information emphasis
While it was important to determine how much information participants gathered during the
error identification process, it was also important to determine the information source on which
they based their error confirmation. The metric that described this was error resolution strategy.
As it was very difficult to discern the exact cognitive strategy of participants during the error
identification process, this metric was limited to only two information sources for which concrete
evidence could be collected. The first was the suggested error information. A participant was
said to base error diagnosis on the suggested error source if the first error selected from the
available error list during diagnostic data collection was the suggested error, while a participant
was said to base error confirmation on the suggested error source if the first error source
confirmed by the participant matched the suggested error.
The second information source for which concrete evidence was collected was likelihood data. A
participant was said to base error diagnosis on likelihood if the first error selected from the
available error list during diagnostic data collection was the most likely error source (based on
the GUIDER pie chart graphic), while a participant was said to base error confirmation on
likelihood if the first error confirmation made matched the most likely error source. This
information source data was only gathered for those participants assigned to the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist, as they were the only participants that were provided with error
likelihood information. Data on the number of participants basing error diagnosis and error
confirmation on one of these two information sources is summarized in Table 7, grouped by
reliability level.
Table 7: Error resolution strategies of participants.
Low Medium High
Basis Checklist
Diagnosis Confirmation Diagnosis Confirmation Diagnosis Confirmation
Traditional 5 2 16 7 16 16
(N = 18)
Suggestion GUIDER 6 2 11 8 13 16(N =18) __ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
Total 11 4 27 15 29 32
(N = 36) _ I I I I
Likelihood GUIDER 2 1 0 0
(N= 18) __
There was great disparity between the number of participants that based error identification on
the suggested error for each of the three reliability levels. In the high reliability scenario, 29 of
36 participants started the error identification process by clicking on the diagnostic test
information associated with the suggested error source. In the medium reliability scenario, the
number was similar, with 27 of 36 participants beginning the diagnostic process with the
suggested error source. In the low reliability scenario, however, only 11 of 36 participants based
their error resolution strategy on the suggested error. A similar trend was observed for the first
error confirmation made by participants, with 32 of 36 confirming the suggested error in the high
reliability scenario, 15 of 36 participants confirming the suggested error in the medium reliability
scenario, and only 4 of 36 participants confirming the suggested error in the low reliability
scenario. This trend did not seem to be affected by the type of checklist tool used for error
resolution, with similar numbers observed in both the Traditional and GUIDER settings.
The reverse trend was seen for the likelihood data in that more participants relied on this
information in the low reliability scenario compared to the medium and high reliability scenarios.
When beginning the error identification process, 2 of 18 participants in the low reliability
scenario started error resolution by clicking on the diagnostic tests associated with the most
likely error source. In the medium and high reliability scenarios, only 1 of 18 participants
followed this strategy. When confirming their first error source, 6 of 18 participants in the low
reliability scenario selected the most likely error, compared to zero participants in the medium
and high reliability settings.
5.3. Subjective feedback
Checklist tool preference was found by comparing the collected responses from the subjective
user interaction questionnaire (Appendix F) using a Mann-Whitney U test. As each participant
only interacted with a single checklist system, a direct comparison between the two tools could
not be made. Subjective preference was also deduced from comments made by participants at the
end of the user interaction questionnaire. Both of these sources of feedback are discussed in the
following subsections.
5.3.1. Questionnaire data
No significance was found between the responses for the two checklists on any questions. Full
results are included in Appendix H and all associated statistical tests are included in Appendix J.
5.3.2. General participant feedback
Of the 36 participants that took part in the experiment, 17 chose to leave additional comments at
the end of the user interaction questionnaire. Six participants (2 using GUIDER Checklist, 4
using Traditional Checklist) mentioned some difficulties in initially understanding the forklift
domain and felt that additional training time should have been provided before beginning the
three simulated error scenarios. Two participants (both using GUIDER Checklist) also stated that
the first scenario they partook in was difficult (low reliability scenario for one participant,
medium reliability for other participant), which provides further evidence that a longer or
enhanced training session might have been beneficial to participants.
Most other comments were related to the design of the checklist tools. Three participants
mentioned a desire to have already-selected error sources removed or highlighted to ensure that
these errors were not reselected in the future. One such participant stated that he was very
focused on the diagnostic information available and did not devote mental resources to tracking
the errors he had already selected. By the time the participant realized the need to perform the
tracking of already confirmed errors, it was too late. Two other participants assigned to the
Traditional Checklist noted their desire to have the error sources listed by highest likelihood of
occurrence in the system, as opposed to an alphabetical listing. A single participant noted a
desire to have the sensor reliability levels incorporated into the GUIDER pie chart graphic as a
combined display. Finally, three participants stated a general liking for their checklist tool: one
participant from the Traditional Checklist setting, and two participants from the GUIDER
Checklist setting.
5.4. Discussion of experimental findings
The human performance experiment collected experimental data to evaluate two error resolution
checklist tools at three sensor reliability levels. Important statistical findings that were identified
through this experiment have been summarized in Table 8.
The collected data followed a somewhat predictable pattern for the primary performance metrics.
Performance, as measured by number of error confirmations, was significantly better when in
the high reliability setting compared to the medium and low reliability setting. There was no
significant difference between the medium and low reliability setting, however, as had been
hypothesized in Section 4.2.1.
Table 8: Summary of experimental results.
Traditional GUIDER Overall
- More confirmations than
. t - Cognitive strategy high scenario; no difference
Low - Cognitive strategy based on likelihood to medium scenariodifficult to discern data - Improved performance with
increased use of diagnostic
tests
- More confirmations than
- More error - Fewer error high scenario; no detected
Medium confirmations confirmations difference to low scenario
compared to compared to - Cognitive strategy based on
GUIDER tool Traditional tool suggested error; not based on
likelihood data
- Less confirmations than low
- Indistinguishable 
- Indistinguishable and medium scenarios
difference in difference in - Worse performance with
High primary primary increased use of diagnosticperformance performance tests
compared to compared to - Cognitive strategy based on
GUIDER tool traditional tool suggested error; not based on
likelihood data
The interaction effects for the six checklist/reliability pairs (Traditional/high,
Traditional/medium, Traditional/low, GUIDER/high, GUIDER/medium, GUIDER/low) were
also investigated, with interesting findings. It was hypothesized that the GUIDER Checklist
system would provide its biggest performance gains during error resolution when uncertainty
was the greatest. In other words, at the low reliability setting, the GUIDER Checklist was
predicted to have significantly better performance when compared to the Traditional Checklist
system. Performance was only found to be statistically different for the two checklists at the
medium reliability setting, with improved performance occurring with the use of the GUIDER
Checklist. Insignificant differences between the two checklists were found for both the low and
high reliability settings.
These results can be explained by considering the scenario uncertainty for each of the three
reliability levels. While the data provided to the participants in the low reliability setting was
uncertain and potentially inaccurate, the participants were told about this uncertainty and as a
result, their cognitive strategy for error resolution was appropriately adjusted. Participants in the
low reliability setting were more inclined to collect data during the error identification portion of
error resolution, and statistical data indicated improved performance in the low reliability setting
with increased use of diagnostic tests and increased time spent collecting data during error
identification. Participants in the low reliability setting were also less likely to base their
diagnostic process and error confirmation on the suggested error source, and for those in the
GUIDER Checklist, were more likely to base confirmation on the provided likelihood data.
In the high reliability setting, there was little to no data uncertainty, and once again, participants
were completely informed about the high certainty level of the data. As a result, participants
were inclined to use fewer diagnostic tests and spend less time collecting data during the error
identification portion of error resolution. This behavior did not negatively impact the
performance of participants, as the high level of certainty did not warrant a cautious approach to
error identification. Participants in the high reliability scenario were also likely to use the
suggested error source to guide their diagnostic approach, and to select the suggested error as
their first error confirmation.
Interestingly, in the high reliability scenario, performance was hindered with additional data
collection and diagnostic test use. This result could be attributed to the level of trust participants
placed in the diagnostic data included as part of the EIR display. From the cognitive strategy
data, it is known that 29 of 36 participants began the error identification process by checking the
diagnostic data for the suggested error source, which in this scenario, was the true error source.
Participants that were trusting of this diagnostic data didn't need to perform any other data
gathering, as the diagnostic information indicated that the suggested error was in fact the failure
source. Participants that were not trusting of this data, however, continued collecting data, and it
appears, eventually made an incorrect error identification. This result indicates that in domains
with high data certainty, it is vital that humans interacting with the system have a high-level of
trust in the data collected by automation, or error resolution performance can suffer.
In the medium reliability setting, data uncertainty was more limited compared to the low
reliability setting, but overall uncertainty was at its maximum as participants were unsure
whether they could trust the information provided to them by the system. While the impact of
this uncertainty on information collection was unclear, it was evident that the information
emphasis of participants more closely mirrored the strategy employed in the high reliability
setting instead of the low reliability setting. The large number of participants (41.6%) that based
their error resolution strategy on the suggested error, and the low number of participants in the
GUIDER Checklist setting that based their error resolution strategy on the likelihood data (0%),
provide evidence for this approach. This suggests that participants had difficulty creating an
independent strategy for the medium reliability setting, and as a result, performance suffered.
However, this performance decrement was significantly improved by the inclusion of the error
likelihood data in the GUIDER Checklist, with this added information significantly reducing
number of error confirmations. The inclusion of error likelihood data as part of the GUIDER
Probabilistic Checklist reduced general scenario uncertainty during error resolution. This
reduction in uncertainty impacted performance levels for the three scenarios. This change in
human behavior supported the hypothesis that performance would be worst in the low reliability
condition and best in the high reliability condition.
5.5. Summary
The results of the human performance experiment indicate that humans have difficulty creating
independent decision-making strategies for more ambiguous certainty levels. Participants in the
experiment were uncertain how much to trust system data in the medium reliability scenario, and
performance suffered as a result. The addition of error likelihood data through the GUIDER
Checklist tool appears to improve error resolution performance in highly uncertain settings. Due
to these positive findings, this checklist design should be investigated further for use in SMU
supervisory domains, where the reliability of sensor data is often uncertain.
Considerations for further research, including design recommendations and limitations of these
findings, will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Chapter 6. Conclusions and Future Work
The goal of this research was to design an alternative checklist, or error resolution tool, for
resolving errors in Shared Manned-Unmanned (SMU) domains. This research began with an
overview of current checklist systems used in traditional Human Supervisory Control (HSC)
domains and through this research, three attributes that impact the effectiveness of a checklist
within such environments were identified: domain predictability, sensor reliability, and time
availability. These attributes were combined into the Checklist Attribute Model (CAM) that
indicated that a large portion of HSC domains, including SMU environments, are not currently
well served by traditional checklist systems. This finding justified the need for the development
of an alternative checklist tool that would redesign the error identification portion of error
resolution. This research is presented in Chapter 2, Background.
The development of the alternative checklist, named the GUIDER (Graphical User Interface for
Directed Error Recovery) Probabilistic Checklist, was then discussed. Past work in the fields of
automation, human judgment under uncertainty, and data visualization were used to guide the
design of the alternative checklist. A prototype version of the display, which included the
GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist, was created for the autonomous forklift SMU domain under
development at the MIT, and termed the Error Identification and Recovery (EIR) display. The
design of GUIDER is detailed in Chapter 3, GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist.
The final objective of this research was to compare error resolution human performance between
the newly developed GUIDER Checklist and a more traditional error resolution tool. This
comparison was made using a human performance experiment outlined in Chapter 4,
Experimental Evaluation. The findings of this experiment were discussed in Chapter 5, Results,
and are summarized in a subsection below. Design recommendations resulting from this
experiment, as well as experiment recommendations and future work, are presented in this
chapter.
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6.1. Experimental results
A significant difference in performance was found for the sensor reliability independent variable,
with performance significantly worse (higher number of error confirmations) for both the low
and medium levels when compared to the high reliability level. No significant main effect was
found for checklist type, indicating that neither checklist was superior to its competitor over all
reliability levels.
Interestingly, performance at the medium reliability level was improved when using the
GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist compared to the Traditional Checklist, while no significance
was seen between the checklists at the low or high reliability levels. These results were attributed
to the actual level of uncertainty that existed during the different reliability settings. While the
low reliability setting had some uncertainty associated with the data that was presented to the
participant, the participant was well aware of this low certainty level, and as a result,
implemented an error resolution methodology that suited the situation. In the medium reliability
setting, the participant was unsure whether they should trust the provided system data, or distrust
the data. The results indicate that the GUIDER Checklist, and the additional error likelihood data
that it provided, assisted the participant with this ambiguous uncertainty level.
The collected cognitive strategy data indicates that many participants implemented an error
resolution methodology at the medium reliability level that was similar to the strategy
implemented at the high reliability level. At both levels, participants were more likely to base
their diagnosis strategy on the error suggested by system sensors. Participants were also more
likely to select the suggested error as their first error confirmation. Error diagnosis and
confirmation at the low reliability level was much less likely to be based on the suggested error
source, indicating the understanding of the participants that when uncertainty was high, such
information was not to be trusted. As the overall performance at the medium reliability level was
improved when using the GUIDER Checklist as opposed to the Traditional Checklist, it appears
that uncertainty levels were mitigated through the decision-support provided by the GUIDER
Checklist and the graphical presentation of error likelihood information contained within the
checklist.
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6.2. Design recommendations
Design recommendations for an error resolution tool for SMU domains stem from the
experimental findings and observations of the human performance experiment. These
recommendations focus on design modifications to the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist for all
SMU domains, as opposed to the prototype EIR display that was developed for the autonomous
forklift environment.
6.2.1. Certainty indicator
While set reliability levels were included for the sensor groups as part of the experiment, in
many SMU domains, the actual reliability of sensors will often be unknown. This will result in a
setting very similar to the medium reliability scenario, where there is a high level of uncertainty
due to the lack of concrete knowledge about the operating environment.
The error resolution strategy employed by participants in the medium setting closely matched the
methodology used in the high sensor reliability scenario. This behavior occurred even though
reliability levels for all sensor groups were included in the EIR display and participants were
aware that the data was untrustworthy. Such error resolution strategies should not be employed
in actual SMU environments as they result in a longer error resolution time and an increase in the
number of incorrect error confirmations, as demonstrated by the collected experiment data. To
ensure that the error resolution strategy employed by the human supervisor is appropriate, further
graphical indication could be included beside the suggested error source to represent the need to
proceed with caution. This indicator could help to overcome the inclination of the human to trust
the suggestion even when there is no concrete evidence to justify this trust.
This visualization could be adjusted using color or size to indicate certainty level. If an error
suggestion is trustworthy, it could be made more salient, drawing the eyes of the supervisor to
the suggestion. Suggestions that should be trusted could also be made larger, again increasing
saliency. It is important, however, even in uncertain conditions, that the supervisor can see the
suggested error source.
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6.2.2. Combined pie chart graphic
During the human performance experiment, one participant noted a desire to have the sensor
reliability information incorporated into the GUIDER pie chart graphic to create a combined
display of reliability and likelihood data. Many participants shifted their gaze between the
reliability information on the EIR display and the error resolution checklist tool. Such an
integrated display would result in less cognitive resources having to be dedicated to the
integration of these two separate information sources.
A combined pie chart display could be designed in a number of ways. The color of each pie slice
(representing a potential error source) could change based on the reliability of the sensor
associated with that error. Gradations of a single color could be used for this purpose, with
higher contrast between a pie slice and the background (increased salience) associated with more
reliable error sources, and lower contrast between a pie slice and the background (decreased
salience) associated with more unreliable error sources. As an alternative, an additional ring
could be added to the pie chart, with this ring incorporating the reliability data. This could create
clutter within the display, however, which should be avoided. This new graphic would have to be
tested and compared to the current layout of the GUIDER Checklist to determine if it presents
any benefit to the supervisor during error resolution.
6.2.3. Indication of selected errors
User feedback that was provided at the end of the user interaction survey indicated a further
possible design modification to the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist, which was graphically
depicting potential error sources that had already been confirmed during the error identification
process. Participants stated that it was difficult to retain a tally of selected errors during error
resolution, since their focus was placed on assimilating the different sources of diagnostic data,
including sensor reliability levels, the suggested error source, and the probabilistic error data.
Visual indication of already-selected errors could be performed using color, by reducing the
contrast between the text and the pie graphic, and therefore, reducing saliency. A further design
intervention could prevent the reselection of an already confirmed error source. This could be
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seen as removing the authority of the human, however, and may frustrate some supervisors.
Therefore, color is recommended to transmit this information to the supervisor. When using
color to transmit data properties, however, colorblind users should always be considered.
A second modification to the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist could be the inclusion of an
archival tool to track previous user actions. By accessing this area of the checklist, users could
see all past interactions ordered by time of occurrence. The benefit of both a visual indication of
selected errors and an archival tool would have to be tested using a heuristic evaluation (Nielsen,
2005), cognitive walkthrough (Wharton, Rieman, Lewis, & Polson, 1994), or another human
performance experiment.
6.2.4. Limiting error sources
The potential for visual clutter with the increase in error sources is a final identified limitation of
the pie chart graphic. If the pie is subdivided into many different errors, the error names, as well
as the associated likelihood data, may be difficult to discern. For this reason, it is recommended
to limit the number of error categories or error sources at a given level. Further experimental and
usability testing would be required to prescribe exact limits.
6.3. Experiment recommendations and future work
The results of this thesis indicate that the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist tool for error
resolution shows promise in domains with ambiguous uncertainty levels. In such settings, the
GUIDER Checklist was demonstrated to improve identification accuracy and error recovery time
during error resolution. There are limitations to these findings, however, as a result of both the
experimental design and the resources available to run the experiment. The following are
recommendations for future work building upon the research presented in this thesis.
- The GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist was evaluated using a simulated version of the
autonomous forklift domain currently under development at MIT. Testing in a more
realistic setting with SMEs is required to determine the true effectiveness of this
alternative checklist tool.
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* GUIDER and the Traditional Checklist should be compared in an HSC domain
categorized by CAM as being appropriate for traditional checklist use (high system
predictability, high sensor reliability, high time availability) to further assess the
Checklist Attribute Model. An example domain would be the commercial airline
industry, which was previously evaluated using CAM in Section 3.5.1.
e Difficult error cases should be investigated. These include situations where the system
detects an error when no error actually exists, as well as compound errors that are the
result of more than one failure.
e A direct method of obtaining subjective user feedback that directly compares the
GUIDER Checklist tool and Traditional Checklist tool should be considered. This would
result in a within-subjects experimental design where each participant resolves an error
scenario using each checklist type.
- Trust by human supervisors in data collected and provided by automation should be
further investigated to determine how this trust could be maximized in HSC domains. It
appears that low levels of trust can negatively impact error resolution performance, even
under high reliability conditions.
e The design recommendations presented in Section 6.2 that resulted from observations of
the human performance experiment should be addressed and further investigated.
If further testing were to occur outside the autonomous forklift domain, a new prototype EIR
display incorporating the GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist (and potentially a Traditional
Checklist, for comparison purposes) would have to be developed to meet the specific needs of
that environment.
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Appendix A: Descriptive Statistics
Subject Gender Age Occupation Checklist Games
1 F 22 EECS N Everyday
2 M 30 ES N Few times/yr
3 M 26 EECS N Everyday
4 M 20 EECS N Few times/wk
5 M 23 Business N Few times/mo
6 M 20 Aerospace N Few times/wk
7 M 23 Aerospace Y Few times/mo
8 M 23 Biology N Everyday
9 M 22 EECS N Few times/yr
10 F 22 EECS N Few times/wk
11 F 23 Biomedical N Few times/yr
12 F 18 Aerospace N Few times/mo
13 M 20 EECS N Few times/yr
14 F 24 Aerospace Y Few times/mo
15 F 22 Aerospace N Few times/yr
16 M 21 Aerospace N Few times/wk
17 F 22 Aerospace N Few times/yr
18 F 20 EECS N Few times/yr
19 M 25 Aerospace Y Few times/mo
20 F 24 Aerospace N Few times/yr
21 M 23 Aerospace N Few times/wk
22 M 19 EECS N Few times/mo
23 M 24 Aerospace Y Few times/mo
24 F 25 EECS N Few times/yr
25 M 24 Physics N Few times/wk
26 F 18 Chemistry Y Few times/yr
27 F 28 Media Arts N Few times/mo
28 F 23 Aerospace N Never
29 F 21 EECS Y Few times/mo
30 M 24 Transportation N Few times/yr
31 F 20 Architecture N Never
32 M 26 EECS Y Few times/mo
33 F 21 Aerospace N Few times/yr
34 F 31 Business Y Few times/yr
35 F 22 EECS N Never
36 M 22 ES N Few times/mo
N 18M, 18F - 14EECS, 13 Aero 8Y, 28N 13yr, I1mo
Mean - 22.81 -
Std. Dev. - 2.92 - -
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Appendix B: Consent to Participate
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
IN NON-BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH
Investigating Error Recovery in a Shared Human-Robot Environment
You are asked to participate in a research study conducted by Dr. Mary Cummings and Jackie
Tappan from the Humans and Automation Laboratory (HAL) at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology (MIT). The results of this study will be used in academic conferences and journals.
You are eligible to participate because you are over 18. You should read the information below,
and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to
participate.
- PARTICIPATION AND WITHDRAWAL
Your participation in this study is completely voluntary and you are free to choose whether to be
in it or not. If you choose to be in this study, you may subsequently withdraw from it at any time
without penalty or consequences of any kind. The investigator may withdraw you from this
research if circumstances arise which warrant doing so. However, we do not foresee this
occurring in this study.
- PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
The purpose of this study is to evaluate error recovery checklists in shared manned-unmanned
domains. The collected data will be used to guide error recovery processes in many shared
supervisory control domains.
- PROCEDURES
After giving your consent, you will be asked to fill out a brief demographic survey documenting
age, gender, previous checklist experience, video gaming experience, and sleepiness levels. Once
this survey has been completed, you will be asked to undergo a training session to get used to the
checklist that will be used throughout the experiment, as well as the general interface. This will
mainly be done through a slide presentation.
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The main experiment will consist of three separate error recovery scenarios. At the beginning of
each scenario, you will read a contextual background summary discussing the reliability of
sensors in the environment, a summary of recent system errors, and other pertinent details. After
reading the contextual background, you will begin the error recovery scenarios. For each
scenario, you will have to both identify and recover from an error in the simulated manned-
unmanned environment. Time to recover, accuracy of error selection, and frequency and location
of mouse clicks will be recorded.
After completing three error scenarios, you will be asked to complete a subjective usability
survey. The study should be completed within 60 minutes.
* POTENTIAL RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS
We do not foresee any risks or discomforts resulting from your participation in this study.
- POTENTIAL BENEFITS
The data will be used to help researchers in designing more effective error recovery checklists
for shared supervisory control domains, particularly those incorporating unmanned surface
vehicles. Such domains will be able to operate more efficiently and more safely.
- PAYMENT FOR PARTICIPATION
You will be given two movie tickets at the completion of this study.
- CONFIDENTIALITY
Any information that is obtained in connection with this study and that can be identified with you
will remain confidential and will be disclosed only with your permission or as required by law.
- IDENTIFICATION OF INVESTIGATORS
If you have any questions or concerns about the research, please feel free to contact Professor
Missy Cummings (Principal Investigator) at missycgcsail.mit.edu or 617-252-1512, or Jackie
Tappan (Co-Investigator) at jtappangcsail.mit.edu or 617-715-4317.
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- EMERGENCY CARE AND COMPENSATION FOR INJURY
If you feel you have suffered an injury, which may include emotional trauma, as a result of
participating in this study, please contact the person in charge of the study as soon as possible.
In the event you suffer such an injury, M.I.T. may provide itself, or arrange for the provision of,
emergency transport or medical treatment, including emergency treatment and follow-up care, as
needed, or reimbursement for such medical services. M.I.T. does not provide any other form of
compensation for injury. In any case, neither the offer to provide medical assistance, nor the
actual provision of medical services shall be considered an admission of fault or acceptance of
liability. Questions regarding this policy may be directed to MIT's Insurance Office, (617) 253-
2823. Your insurance carrier may be billed for the cost of emergency transport or medical
treatment, if such services are determined not to be directly related to your participation in this
study.
- RIGHTS OF RESEARCH SUBJECTS
You are not waiving any legal claims, rights or remedies because of your participation in this
research study. If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your
rights as a research subject, you may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of
Humans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T., Room E25-143b, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge,
MA 02139, phone 1-617-253 6787.
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SIGNATURE OF RESEARCH SUBJECT OR LEGAL REPRESENTATIVE I
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my
satisfaction, and I agree to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.
Name of Subject
Name of Legal Representative (if applicable)
Signature of Subject or Legal Representative Date
SIGNATURE OF INVESTIGATOR I
In my judgment the subject is voluntarily and knowingly giving informed consent and possesses
the legal capacity to give informed consent to participate in this research study.
Signature of Investigator Date
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Appendix C: Demographic Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions:
1. Gender:
o Male
o Female
2. Age:
3. Occupation or research field:
4. Do you have any previous experience using checklists?
o Yes
o No
5. If so, please describe in detail:
6. How often do you play video games?
o Never
o Few times a year
o Few times a month
o Few times a week
o Everyday
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Appendix D: Training Tutorials
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Appendix E: Training Video Script
The scenario begins at the contextual background screen. There are two major components to
this screen: the first is the background summary, which will give you an overview of recent
system behavior, and the second is the sensor reliability level summary, which provides an
overview of each of the six sensor groups in the system. The sensors can range in reliability from
low, to medium, to high. This summary provides an overview of how accurate information
provided by the sensor group can be assumed to be. If a sensor has low reliability, information
provided by that sensor to the supervisor may be inaccurate, while if a sensor group has high
reliability, information provided by that sensor can be assumed to be fairly accurate. Once you
have reviewed this information, you can begin the scenario.
The five components discussed in the tutorial presentation are easily identifiable. At the top of
the interface are the different forklift tabs; you have the forklift view, which is the feedback from
the on-forklift camera; you have a copy of the sensor reliability summary that was presented in
the contextual summary; the error identification and recovery checklist, with the error
identification portion currently shown. Once you select an error and confirm it, the interface will
transition into the error recovery portion. Finally, at the bottom of the interface are the seven
steps that make up the pallet pick up and delivery process.
Currently, we can see that Forklift 1 is encountering an error at the Approach Pallet functional
step. We can see this because Approach Pallet is highlighted, and colored red, and also because
the system is suggesting an error source. When trying to determine whether the suggested error
source is the true error source, there are a number of information sources that can be used. The
first is the sensor reliability summary that is presented. This information guides the supervisor in
whether they should trust the error source being suggested by the system. In this particular case,
it can be seen that the Obstacle Detection Sensors, which provides information about the Path
Blocked error, has a high reliability level. Therefore, the suggested error source should be
considered fairly accurate. Other information sources include the forklift view, the error
likelihood data presented in the pie chart graphic [this statement was only included in the
probabilistic checklist video], as well as the diagnostic tests, which can be accessed after
selecting an error source. For example, by clicking on Wrong Pallet Detected, you can access the
diagnostic tests related to this error at the bottom of the interface. When clicking on a diagnostic
test, the diagnostic information is presented in the Forklift View portion of the interface. Some
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errors will not have any diagnostic test information available, but will instead have additional
information available from the supervising assistant. In the experiment, the experimental
administrator will play the supervising assistant. If you want this information, simply ask the
administrator for any available information on that particular error. Ultimately, it is up to you to
decide what information you need to identify the true error source and recover from the error.
Once you have selected what you believe to be the error source, you can confirm it and move
to error recovery. There are a couple of steps that must be completed before an error can be
resolved. The first step is assigning the recovery task to one of the ground-level operators in the
environment. You should assign the task to the operator that is closest to the failed forklift using
the map of the system provided. Once you have assigned the task, the operator will investigate
the error, and the error will either be resolved, if you identified the error correctly, or remain, if
you incorrectly identified the error source. If incorrectly identified, you will have to return to
Error Identification and select a new error source. If correctly identified, you can continue to the
next error scenario.
126
Appendix F: User Interaction Questionnaire
Please answer the following questions about the checklist system that you just used to complete
the experimental task.
1. I liked using this checklist system for error recovery.
o Strongly agree
o Agree
o Neither agree or disagree
o Disagree
o Strongly disagree
2. I found the error recovery task
o Very straightforward
o Straightforward
o Neither straightforward or confusing
o Confusing
o Very confusing
3. I felt
o Very confident
o Confident
o Neither confident or u
o Unsure
o Very unsure
4. I felt
with this system.
using this checklist system for error recovery.
nsure
recovering from errors using this checklist system.
o Very comfortable
o Comfortable
o Neither comfortable or uncomfortable
o Uncomfortable
o Very uncomfortable
5. Overall, I was with th is checklist system.
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o Very satisfied
o Satisfied
o Neither satisfied or unsatisfied
o Unsatisfied
o Very unsatisfied
6. My mental workload during this task was:
o Very high
o High
o Neither high or low
o Low
o Very low
7. My frustration level during this task was:
o Very high
o High
o Neither high or low
o Low
o Very low
8. My overall performance on this task was:
o Very high
o High
o Neither high or low
o Low
o Very low
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Appendix G: Randomization of Participants
Subject Display Type Order Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
1 T 3 Medium Low High
2 P 3 Medium Low High
3 T 5 High Low Medium
4 P 6 High Medium Low
5 T 4 Medium High Low
6 P 2 Low High Medium
7 P 5 High Low Medium
8 P 4 Medium High Low
9 T 1 Low Medium High
10 T 1 Low Medium High
11 P 2 Low High Medium
12 T 2 Low High Medium
13 T 5 High Low Medium
14 T 6 High Medium Low
15 T 4 Medium High Low
16 P 1 Low Medium High
17 P 5 High Low Medium
18 P 4 High Medium Low
19 T 4 High Medium Low
20 P 1 Low Medium High
21 P 3 Medium Low High
22 T 3 Medium Low High
23 T 2 Low High Medium
24 P 4 Medium High Low
25 T 6 High Medium Low
26 P 5 High Low Medium
27 T 5 High Low Medium
28 P 4 Medium High Low
29 T 1 Low Medium High
30 T 3 Medium Low High
31 T 4 Medium High Low
32 P 6 High Medium Low
33 T 2 Low High Medium
34 P 1 Low Medium High
35 P 2 Low High Medium
36 P 3 Medium Low High
T = Traditional Checklist
P = GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist
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Appendix H: Collected Data
Number of error confirmations:
Overall Descriptive Statistics
Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
Mean 3.14 4.50 1.14
Median 2.00 4.00 1.00
Mode 2 5 1
STDEV 2.26 2.59 0.54
Min 1 1
Max 9 10 4
Traditional Checklist
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
1 T 3 10
3 T 2 5
5 T 3 2
9 T 8 5
10 T 2 3
12 T 1 7
13 T 1 3
14 T 2 5
15 T 2 3
19 T 1 10 1
22 T 1 5 2
23 T 2 5 1
25 T 1 5 1
27 T 2 8 1
29 T 1 2 1
30 T 2 4 2
31 T 5 10 1
33 T 2 1 1
Mean 2.28 5.17 1.11
Median 2.00 5.00 1.00
Mode 2 5 1
STDEV 1.74 2.81 0.32
Min 1 1
Max 8 10 2
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GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
2 P 1 4
4 P 5 4
6 P 5 1 1
7 P 5 3 1
8 P 4 6 1
11 P 7 1 1
16 P 1 3 1
17 P 1 1 1
18 P 4 2 1
20 P 3 5 1
21 P 4 7
24 P 4 6 1
26 P 2 3
28 P 2 7 1
32 P 9 2 4
34 P 3 2 1
35 P 9 8 1
36 P 3 4 1
Mean 4.00 3.83 1.17
Median 4.00 3.50 1.00
Mode 4 4 1
STDEV 2.43 2.23 0.71
Min 1 1 1
Max 9 8 4
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Time to complete error scenario:
Overall Descriptive Statistics
Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
Mean 455.69 530.22 135.78
Median 402.00 425.00 104.50
STDEV 237.43 310.93 108.85
Min 136 142 26
Max 1052 1416 585
Traditional Checklist
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
1 T 180 840 60
3 T 292 611 385
5 T 422 400 72
9 T 844 359 68
10 T 366 241 69
12 T 180 720 120
13 T 212 473 107
14 T 372 1147 130
15 T 315 311 81
19 T 331 929 45
22 T 279 1416 585
23 T 565 1010 124
25 T 408 1025 107
27 T 218 416 26
29 T 313 439 96
30 T 228 475 204
31 T 446 711 145
33 T 981 222 91
Mean 386.22 652.50 139.72
Median 323.00 543.00 101.50
STDEV 217.45 343.15 136.38
Min 180 222 26
Max 981 , 1416 585
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GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
2 P 136 536 192
4 P 543 385 134
6 P 738 161 151
7 P 617 351 102
8 P 502 626 97
11 P 724 142 113
16 P 396 323 72
17 P 335 160 124
18 P 711 361 102
20 P 784 775 146
21 P 472 607 63
24 P 262 434 84
26 P 207 186 73
28 P 433 973 169
32 P 592 277 300
34 P 1052 311 324
35 P 726 366 50
36 P 223 369 77
Mean 525.15 407.94 131.83
Median 522.50 363.50 102.00
STDEV 241.98 222.78 75.91
Min 136 142 50
Max 1052 973 324
134
Time to first error confirmation:
Overall Descriptive Statistics
Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
Mean 212.44 150.64 90.92
Median 183.50 111.00 64.00
STDEV 153.64 110.33 98.28
Min 39 14 11
Max 713 508 505
Traditional Checklist
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
1 T 60 180 41
3 T 168 200 345
5 T 198 125 48
9 T 221 51 24
10 T 135 48 25
12 T 120 60 60
13 T 172 242 75
14 T 212 508 66
15 T 156 80 41
19 T 299 93 26
22 T 227 319 505
23 T 322 275 71
25 T 386 254 60
27 T 125 47 11
29 T 273 378 73
30 T 126 235 93
31 T 102 70 114
33 T 696 179 52
Mean 222.11 185.78 96.11
Median 185.00 179.50 60.00
STDEV 145.08 129.73 125.40
Min 60 47 11
Max 696 508 505
135
GUIDER Probabilistic Checklist
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
2 P 112 107 143
4 P 74 77 85
6 P 205 103 125
7 P 58 142 53
8 P 220 130 56
11 P 125 94 89
16 P 364 105 39
17 P 291 115 83
18 P 297 132 77
20 P 378 254 107
21 P 195 107 29
24 P 92 48 39
26 P 90 29 22
28 P 148 334 126
32 P 47 80 96
34 P 713 128 295
35 P 202 14 17
36 P 39 80 62
Mean 202.78 115.50 85.72
Median 171.50 106.00 80.00
STDEV 165.38 74.94 64.07
Min 39 14 17
Max 713 334 295
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Error resolution strategy:
Diagnoses (D) and confirmations (C) based on suggested error for each checklist.
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
D C D C D C
1 T 0 1 0 1 1 1
3 T 0 0 1 0 1 1
5 T 0 0 1 0 1 1
9 T 0 1 1 1 1 1
10 T 0 0 1 1 1 1
12 T 0 0 1 1 1 1
13 T 0 0 1 0 1 1
14 T 0 0 1 0 1 1
15 T 0 0 1 1 1 1
19 T 1 0 1 0 1 1
22 T 1 0 0 1 1 0
23 T 1 0 1 0 1 1
25 T 0 0 1 0 1 1
27 T 0 0 1 0 0 1
29 T 1 0 1 0 1 1
30 T 0 0 1 0 0 0
31 T 0 0 1 1 1 1
33 T 1 0 1 0 1 1
Traditional Total 5 2 16 7 16 16
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
D C D C D C
2 P 0 0 1 1 1 1
4 P 1 0 0 1 0 1
6 P 0 0 0 0 1 1
7 P 0 1 0 0 1 1
8 P 0 0 1 1 1 1
11 P 0 0 1 0 1 1
16 P 1 0 1 1 1 1
17 P 1 0 1 0 1 1
18 P 0 0 1 1 1 1
20 P 0 0 0 0 0 1
21 P 0 0 1 1 1 1
24 P 0 1 0 1 1 1
26 P 1 0 1 0 1 1
28 P 0 0 1 0 1 1
32 P 1 0 1 0 0 0
34 P 1 0 1 0 0 0
35 P 0 0 0 0 1 1
36 P 0 0 0 1 0 1
Probabilistic Total 6 2 11 8 13 16
Overall Total 11 4 27 15 29 32
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Diagnoses and confirmations based on likelihood data for probabilistic checklist.
Subject Checklist Low Reliability Medium Reliability High Reliability
D C D C D C
2 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
4 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
6 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
7 P 0 1 0 0 0 0
8 P 1 0 0 0 0 0
11 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
16 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
17 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
18 P 0 1 0 0 0 0
20 P 1 1 1 0 0 0
21 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
24 P 0 1 0 0 0 0
26 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
28 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
32 P 0 1 0 0 1 0
34 P 0 1 0 0 0 0
35 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
36 P 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 2 6 1 0 1 0
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Subjective user interaction:
User interaction questionnaire data.
Subject Checklist Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
T 4 2 3 4 4 3 4 3
3 T 2 5 5 4 4 2 5 2
5 T 3 4 2 2 3 2 5 2
9 T 4 3 3 3 3 4 2 2
10 T 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 3
12 T 4 5 4 4 5 3 3 4
13 T 3 3 5 4 4 4 4 3
14 T 4 3 4 4 4 4 4 3
15 T 4 4 3 4 4 4 3 3
19 T 4 2 5 5 4 4 2 3
22 T 2 4 2 2 2 5 5 2
23 T 3 2 3 3 2 3 5 2
25 T 5 4 4 4 5 3 3 2
27 T 5 5 4 4 4 3 2 3
29 T 4 3 4 4 3 3 2 4
30 T 5 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
31 T 4 3 2 4 3 3 4 1
33 T 4 4 3 4 4 3 3 4
M ean 3.78 3.50 3.44 3.72 3.67 3.33 3.50 2.72
STDEV 0.88_ 0.99 1.04- 0.75 0.84 0.77 1.10 0.83
Subject Checklist Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
2 P 4 3 2 3 4 4 2 3
4 P 4 4 2 4 3 2 2 1
6 P 5 4 3 4 4 3 2 3
7 P 2 2 1 3 2 3 4 3
8 P 4 4 4 5 4 4 4 3
11 P 4 3 2 3 4 3 4 3
16 P 5 5 4 4 5 2 1 4
17 P 5 4 4 5 5 4 3 5
18 P 3 2 2 3 3 3 3 2
20 P 4 4 4 4 4 4 3 3
21 P 4 4 2 4 4 4 4 2
24 P 4 4 4 4 4 3 3 3
26 P 4 5 5 5 5 3 2 4
28 P 5 3 3 4 4 5 4 4
32 P 5 4 4 4 4 4 4 2
34 P 4 3 4 4 4 2 2 3
35 P 2 3 2 3 2 3 5 5
36 P 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2
Mean 4.00 3.61 3.06 3.89 3.83 3.33 3.11 3.06
STDEV 0.91 0.85 1.11 0.68 0.86 0.84 1.08 1.06
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Appendix I: Statistical Assumption Tests
Correlation, number of error confirmations and time to complete scenario:
Correlations
TotaTime Selections
Spearman's rho TotalTime Correlation Coeffkient 1.000 .810"
Sig. (2-tailed) . .000
N 72 72
Selections Correlation Coefficient .810" 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .000
N 72 72
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Number of error confirmations:
Tests of Normality
Checklist Kolmogorov-Smirnov Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Error Confirmations Traditional .264 36 .000 .767 36 .000
GUIDER .247 36 .000 .767 36 .000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Levene
Statistic dfl df2 Sig.
Error Confirmations Based on Mean .291 1 70 .591
Based on Median .047 1 70 .829
Based on Median and .047 1 67.480 .829
with adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean .203 1 70 .654
ANOVA assumption checks of number of error confirmations data for checklist type.
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Tests of Normality
Reliability Kolmogorov-Smirnova Shapiro-Wilk
Statistic df Sig. Statistic df Sig.
Error Confirmations Low .220 24 .004 .837 24 .001
Medium .187 24 .030 .905 24 .028
High .533 24 .000 .316 24 .000
a. Lilliefors Significance Correction
Test of Homogeneity of Variance
Levene
Statistic dfl df2 Sig.
Error Confirmations Based on Mean 18.950 2 69 .000
Based on Median 11.363 2 69 .000
Based on Median and 11.363 2 46.561 .000
with adjusted df
Based on trimmed mean 18.496 2 69 .000
ANOVA assumption checks of number of error confirmations data for reliability level.
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Appendix J: Detailed Statistical Results
Number of error identifications:
Crosstab
Count
Number of Confirmations
1 2 3 4 S 7 8 9 10 Total
Checklist Traditional 15 8 4 0 6 1 1 0 1 36
GUIDER 17 S 4 5 3 0 1 1 0 36
Total 32 13 8 5 9 1 2 1 1 72
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
Value df (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 9.817a 8 .278
Likelihood Ratio 12.933 8 .114
Linear-by-Linear .150 1 .699
Association
N of Valid Cases 72
a. 14 cells (77.8%) have expected count less than 5. The
minimum expected count is .50.
Chi-Square Test of relationship between number of confirmations and checklist.
Crosstab
Count
Number of Confirmations
1 2 3 4 5 7 8 9 10 Total
Reliability Low 6 7 3 4 3 0 0 1 0 24
Medium 4 4 S 1 6 1 2 0 1 24
High 22 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 24
Total 32 13 8 5 9 1 2 1 1 72
Chi-Square Tests
Asymp. Sig.
Value df (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square 47.123a 16 .000
Likelihood Ratio 52.361 16 .000
Linear-by-Linear 8.471 1 .004
Association
N of Valid Cases 72
a. 24 cells (88.9%) have expected count less than S. The
minimum expected count is .33.
Chi-Square Test of relationship between number of confirmations and reliability.
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Ranks
N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
MediumTime - Negative Ranks 10a 10.70 107.00
Low-Time Positive Ranks 14b 13.79 193.00
Ties OC
Total 24
HighTime - Lowjime Negative Ranks 22d 13.32 293.00
Positive Ranks 2e 3.50 7.00
Ties Of
Total 24
High Time - Negative Ranks 239 12.83 295.00
MediumTime Positive Ranks 1h 5.00 5.00
Ties 0'
Total 24
a. MediumTime < LowTime
b. MediumTime > Low.Time
c. MediumTime - Low.Time
d. HighTime < Low.Time
e. HighTime > Low-Time
f. HighTime = Low.Time
g. High_Time < Medium_Time
h. High_Time > MediumTime
i. HighTime = MediumTime
Test StatisticsC
Medium.. HighTime -
Time - High_Time - MediumTim
Low-Time LowTime e
2 -1.229A -4.086b -4.143b
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .219 .000 .000
a. Based on negative ranks.
b. Based on positive ranks.
c. Wilcoxon Signed Ranks Test
Wilcoxon Signed Rank Test comparing number of error confirmations at each of the three
reliability levels.
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Ranks
Test Statisticsb
Error
Confirmations
(Low)
Mann-Whitney U 38.000
Wilcoxon W 116.000
Z -2.011
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .044
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed .052a
Sig.)]
Mann-Whitney Test comparing number of error confirnations at low reliability level between
traditional checklist and GUIDER checklist.
Ranks
Checklist N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Error Confirmations Traditional 12 15.50 186.00(Medium) GUIDER 12 9.50 114.00
Total 24
Test Statisticsb
Error
Confirmations
(Medium)
Mann-Whitney U 36.000
Witcoxon W 114.000
Z -2.114
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .035
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed .039a
Sig.)]
Mann-Whitney Test comparing number of error confirmations at medium reliability level
between traditional checklist and GUIDER checklist.
145
Rank s
Checklist N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Error Confirmations Traditional 12 13.50 162.00
(High) GUIDER 12 11.50 138.00
Total 24
Test Statisticsb
Error
Confirmations(High)
Mann-Whitney U 60.000
Wilcoxon W 138.000
Z -1.446
Asymp. Sig. (2 -tailed) .148
Exact Sig. (2*(1-tailed .514a
Sig.)]
Mann-Whitney Test comparing number of error confirmations at high reliability level between
traditional checklist and GUIDER checklist.
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Cognitive strategies:
Correlations
Error
Confirmations Diagnostic
(Low) Tests (Low)
Spearman's rho Error Confirmations Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -.S65"
(Low) Sig. (2 -tailed) 
.004
N 24 24
Diagnostic Tests (Low) Correlation Coefficient -. 56S 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .004
N 24 24
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
Correlation between number of error confirmations at low reliability and number of diagnostic
tests utilized at low reliability.
Correlations
Error
Confirmations Diagnostic Tests(Medium) (Medium)
Spearman's rho Error Confirmations Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -. 129(Medium) Sig. (2 -tailed) .S47
N 24 24
Diagnostic Tests Correlation Coefficient -. 129 1.000(Medium) Sig. (2-tailed) 
.547
N 24 24
Correlation between number of error confimnations at medium reliability and number of
diagnostic tests utilized at medium reliability.
Correlations
Error
Confirmations Diagnostic Tests
(High) (High)
Spearman's rho Error Confirmations Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .507'(High) Sig. (2-tailed) 
.
.012
N 24 24
Diagnostic Tests (High) Correlation Coefficient .S07' 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .012
N 24 24
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
Correlation between number of error confirmations at high reliability and number of diagnostic
tests utilized at high reliability.
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Correlations
Error Time to First
Confirmations Confirmation
(Low) (Low)
Spearman's rho Error Confirmations Correlation 1.000 -. S38"(Low) Coefficient
Sig. (2 -tailed) . .007
N 24 24
Time to First Correlation -. S38" 1.000
Confirmation (Low) Coefficient
Sig. (2 -tailed) .007
N 24 24
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2 -tailed).
Correlation between number of error confirmations at low reliability and time to first error
confirmation at low reliability.
Correlations
Error Time to First
Confirmations Confirmation
(Medium) (Medium)
Spearman's rho Error Confirmations Correlation Coefficient 1.000 -. 172(Medium) Sig. (2-tailed) 
.
.422
N 24 24
Time to First Correlation Coefficient -. 172 1.000
Confirmation (Medium) Sig. (2 -tailed) 
.422
N 24 24
Correlation between number of error confirmations at medium reliability and time to first error
confirmation at medium reliability.
Correlations
Time to First
Error Confirmations Confirmation
(High) (High)
Spearman's rho Error Confirmations Correlation Coefficient 1.000 .349(High) Sig. (2-tailed) 
.
.095
N 24 24
Time to First Correlation Coefficient .349 1.000
Confirmation (High) Sig. (2-tailed) 
.095
N 24 24
Correlation between number of error confirmations at high reliability and time to first error
confirmation at high reliability.
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Subjective user interaction:
Ranks
Checklist N Mean Rank Sum of Ranks
Q1 1 18 17.06 307.00
2 18 19.94 359.00
Total 36
Q2 1 18 17.83 321.00
2 18 19.17 345.00
Total 36
Q3 1 18 20.17 363.00
2 18 16.83 303.00
Total 36
Q4 1 18 17.92 322.50
2 18 19.08 343.50
Total 36
Q5 1 18 17.39 313.00
2 18 19.61 353.00
Total 36
Q6 1 18 18.39 331.00
2 18 18.61 335.00
Total 36
Q7 1 18 20.14 362.50
2 18 16.86 303.50
Total 36
Q8 1 18 16.94 305.00
2 18 20.06 361.00
Total 36
Test Statisticsb
Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q6 Q7 Q8
Mann-Whitney U 136.000 150.000 132.000 151.500 142.000 160.000 132.SOO 134.000
Wilcoxon W 307.000 321.000 303.000 322.500 313.000 331.000 303.500 305.000
Z -. 911 -. 401 -. 990 -. 389 -. 710 -. 068 -. 968 -. 941
Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) .362 .688 .322 .698 .477 .946 .333 .347
Exact Sig. [2*(1-tailed .424a .719a .355a .743a .5 4 2 a .963a .355a .389a
Sig.)] 
- IIIIIIIII
a. Not corrected for ties.
b. Grouping Variable: Checklist
Mann Whitney Test comparing participant responses to subjective survey questions.
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